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CREATIVE LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
Raymond H. Brescia* 
 
Lawyers have long played an integral part in efforts to bring about 
social change. With an increasing desire to see change in the world, 
regardless of one’s political perspective, there is a growing interest in 
understanding the role that lawyers can play in bringing about such 
change. This type of lawyering is complex, however, and faces far 
more challenges than those the traditional lawyer faces in his or her 
work. Although all lawyers solve problems on behalf of their clients, 
the role of the social-change lawyer is more complex because the 
problems she seeks to address are more complex, mostly because she 
is not trying to operate within the existing legal system on behalf of 
her client but, rather, trying to change it. Indeed, the social-change 
lawyer often faces complex problems that require complex and 
creative solutions. This article explores the nature of the creativity 
required of the social-change lawyer by an assessment of three 
campaigns for social change in which lawyers played prominent 
roles: the effort to abolish slavery, the campaign to end Jim Crow 
segregation, and the movement for marriage equality. This review 
unearths several common components of these campaigns. For 
example, they typically sought incremental change, used 
interpretative tools that helped reframe the issues affecting their 
clients, brought in interdisciplinary perspectives, sought to build 
coalitions based on areas where the interests of different communities 
might converge, and were conscious of trends and forces occurring 
outside the law that were likely to affect the legal campaigns. It is 
through an assessment of these successful efforts and an 
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identification of the common characteristics of such creative problem 
solving for social change that I hope will serve as inspiration for 
those working for positive social change, today and in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether evidenced by the election of Donald J. Trump to the 
United States presidency, the Brexit vote in Great Britain, the 
Women’s Marches, or the advocacy for stricter gun laws in the wake 
of the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, there appears to be a 
clamoring, on the right and the left, for social change.1 Many of these 
efforts are organized at the grassroots level organically, and some are 
orchestrated by wealthy donors.2 Whether organic or orchestrated, 
many participating in such efforts are dissatisfied with the status quo 
and seek social change regardless of their political perspective.3 
When people seek social change, they often see a problem before 
them that they want solved, whether it is to end gender-based, 
workplace harassment and sexual violence4 or to relieve corporations 
of what are perceived as burdensome, “job-killing” regulations.5 In 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-
Nots and Cultural Backlash 9–10 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. RWP16-026, Aug. 2016) (describing and explaining rise of conservative populism); Michelle 
Cottle, How Parkland Students Changed the Gun Debate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/parkland-students-power/554399/ 
[https://perma.cc/QQ44-9EZL] (describing the role of students in gun control advocacy). 
 2. Eliza Newlin Carney, Who’s Behind the Women’s March?, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://prospect.org/article/who%E2%80%99s-behind-women%E2%80%99s-march 
[https://perma.cc/PL8D-QZAR] (describing grassroots organizing behind the Women’s March). See 
generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE 
OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016) (describing funding of conservative groups). 
 3. See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF 
REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 25–28 (2016); revg33k, Forum Post: First Official Release from Occupy 
Wall Street, (Sept. 30, 2011), http://occupywallst.org/forum/first-official-release-from-occupy-wall-
street/ [https://perma.cc/3PB3-PWWJ] (describing “grievances” that motivated actions of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement). 
 4. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the 
Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 590 (1986) (describing the role of rights claims on behalf 
of women to advance social change). 
 5. Elizabeth Kolbert, The E.P.A.’s Dangerous Anti-Regulatory Policies, NEW YORKER (June 30, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-epas-dangerous-anti-regulatory-policies 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ76-PZSB] (describing the formation of a task force within the Trump 
 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1
2019] CREATIVE LAWYERING 531 
what Gillian Hadfield calls a “law-thick world,”6 the solutions to 
address problems like these often involve some change to the legal 
infrastructure that addresses the social issue that advocates seek to 
affect when they pursue social change.7 And, to effect this social 
change, creativity in finding solutions is often a critical feature of any 
effort to change that legal or regulatory infrastructure. In addition to 
the conscious efforts of individuals, groups, and corporations to 
effectuate social change through legal and policy advocacy, 
campaign donations, and community mobilization, social change is 
also happening whether or not it is driven by forces that may have 
humans at the center of the change, like commercial ventures that 
produce technological change,8 or occurs despite the best efforts by 
some to curtail them, like climate change as a product of human 
activity that sets natural forces and responses in motion.9 Whether 
humans cause these problems directly—and intentionally—or only 
indirectly—and unintentionally—human agency is central to address 
the range of problems the world presently faces.10 Given the 
complexity of these problems, creativity is needed to craft 
solutions.11 What is more, the curation of legal, policy, and 
                                                                                                                 
Administration to eliminate “job-killing regulations”). 
 6. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the 
(Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43 (2014). 
 7. For a description of several campaigns to bring about social change by efforts to change the legal 
infrastructure in several different legal and policy contexts, see generally DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF 
LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (describing 
efforts to promote marriage equality, Second Amendment rights, and to protect the rights of detainees 
held as a result of the law enforcement effort called the War on Terror). 
 8. See generally KEVIN KELLY, THE INEVITABLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 12 TECHNOLOGICAL 
FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE (2016) (describing technological changes that are affecting 
and will affect the future of the human race). 
 9. On the impact of human behavior and technological change on the environment and climate, see 
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 92–110 (2014). 
 10. Erle C. Ellis, Science Alone Won’t Save the Earth. People Have to Do That., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/11/opinion/sunday/science-people-environment-
earth.html [https://perma.cc/K4UZ-EUAV] (arguing that human action is essential to address some of 
the world’s problems like climate change, overpopulation, and reduction in biodiversity). 
 11. Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175, 184 (1996). As Philip Schrag 
argues, “One of the hallmarks of an effective lawyer is that he or she can (1) recognize those occasions 
when doing a task by the book is not likely to achieve satisfactory results, (2) figure out a creative 
alternative, and (3) find the courage to deviate from the accepted norm of practice.” Id. 
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regulatory solutions to these problems will likely be at the center of 
efforts to address these problems, whether solutions involve building 
up and increasing or taking away and reducing the size and scope of 
the legal, policy, and regulatory infrastructure that addresses these 
problems. If creative problem solving is a necessary element of social 
change now and in the future, and a core element of this problem 
solving will require legal, policy, and regulatory responses to these 
problems, lawyers will be at the center of social change for the 
foreseeable future.12 Given the complexity of the problems and the 
need for creative solutions to address them, it will not be just any 
lawyers at the center of this change but rather creative ones. If this is 
the case, can we identify the elements of creative lawyering for social 
change so that we might understand what it will take to prepare and 
train lawyers to assume their proper role in efforts to bring about this 
change? This article attempts to identify these elements by a review 
of three moments in American social and political history when 
lawyers played a critical role in crafting creative solutions to thorny 
social problems. 
The lawyers I highlight in this review include several lawyers 
involved in the effort to end slavery in the United States, those 
engaged in the legal fight to dismantle the Jim Crow system in the 
South in the mid-twentieth century, and lawyers committed to the 
recent effort to bring about marriage equality for the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) community. Although the 
lawyers in these moments were not the sole actors in the 
social-change effort that unfolded in these particular points in history 
or even the main drivers of the campaign to end slavery, in all three 
examples, the lawyers I highlight played key roles in helping to craft 
not just our understanding of these problems but also creative 
responses to them.13 In at least the last two examples, the creative 
                                                                                                                 
 12. GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED LAW AND HOW TO 
REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2017). To turn to Gillian Hadfield again, “[A]ny 
solutions we think we are developing toward clean energy, reduced poverty, or safer disease-free 
communities depend on developing better legal infrastructure.” Id. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1
2019] CREATIVE LAWYERING 533 
lawyers I highlight helped to lead the legal struggle to reconstruct an 
edifice of inclusion and equality and solve dramatic legal inequalities 
with an ultimate goal of rectifying broader societal inequalities. The 
hope is that this review can help unearth lessons from past instances 
when lawyers used creativity to advance social change, particularly 
social change that had a legal component at its center, to help inform 
efforts in the present and future to effect similar social change. 
With these goals in mind, this article proceeds as follows. Part I 
reviews the literature on creativity in the law to show that, contrary to 
popular perception, there can be creativity to the lawyer’s craft 
generally, and Part I reviews the techniques that lawyers often use 
when they seek to address their clients’ problems creatively. Part I 
also explores the ways in which social-change lawyering is different 
from, and can often be more complex than, more traditional 
lawyering. 
Part II explores three examples of instances where lawyers played 
a significant role in helping advance social change. The hope is that 
this exploration will help unearth common themes regarding the 
approaches these lawyers appear to have taken in advancing social 
change, creatively and intentionally. These three examples involve 
the effort to end slavery in the United States, the campaign to 
dismantle Jim Crow, and the effort for recognition of same-sex 
marriage. These three examples offer critical lessons about what 
creative lawyering for social change entails. 
Part III identifies what I consider to be the five common 
components of these campaigns for social change. This review 
suggests that these components include, first, that the lawyers have 
often proceeded incrementally and in an iterative, experimental 
fashion. They have looked for ways to build support for their legal 
position both in the courts of law and in public opinion, seeking a 
tipping point where the solutions they propose gain and secure 
traction and ultimately create a new legal paradigm around the 
problem.14 Second, creative lawyers advocating for social change 
                                                                                                                 
 14. On the concept of tipping points in constitutional adjudication, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
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have typically viewed the legal problem that presented itself in a way 
that others had not viewed it, often taking the arguments of their 
adversaries, co-opting them, turning them on their heads, reframing 
them, and shifting them to the lawyers’ advantage.15 Third, creative 
lawyers are humble enough to incorporate the viewpoints and 
approaches of other disciplines, bringing different domains into the 
advocacy effort to strengthen their legal arguments.16 Fourth, lawyers 
often seek out, both consciously and unconsciously, what the late 
Derrick Bell called “Interest Convergence”: opportunities for 
different sectors in society to share a common goal based on their 
similar, though often different, particular interests.17 Fifth, creative 
lawyers for social change often recognize that their advocacy does 
not appear in a vacuum; it is dependent on and occurs simultaneously 
with changes occurring in broader society.18 In these ways, social-
change lawyering is interdependent with larger social forces, and the 
creative lawyer must take these social forces into account when she 
engages in efforts to bring about social change. 
The final section, Part IV explores the implications of this 
taxonomy of creative social-change lawyering and charts a path 
forward for those who might want to bring creativity to this 
endeavor, either because they are currently lawyers advocating for 
social change, current law students or law faculty, or even those who 
are simply contemplating going to law school. This article tries to 
spark a discussion about the proper role of creativity in lawyering at 
this time of great social ferment when many seek to advance social 
                                                                                                                 
Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1955, 1974–75 (2006). 
 15. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–35 (1950) (discussion of litigation strategy of the 
NAACP LDF, where the lawyers argued not only that “separate but equal” was unconstitutional but also 
that the alternative law school for African-American students set up by the University of Texas may 
have been separate but was not equal); see infra text accompanying notes 152–169. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 170–184 (describing marriage equality litigation that included 
testimony from experts from fields other than law). 
 17. See infra Part III.D and citations contained therein. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 145–49 (describing President Lincoln’s decision to withhold 
the release of the Emancipation Proclamation until there was a Union victory on the field of battle). 
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change and alter the legal landscape to address what they see as 
societal ills. 
I.   Creative Problem Solving and the Law 
A.   Lawyering as Creative Problem Solving 
The world’s natural resources are under threat, and the ability to 
feed a growing global population faces serious challenges due to the 
specter of drought, the inundation of farmlands, the erosion of top 
soil, and other problems caused by climate change.19 Armed conflict 
in the Middle East and Africa,20 political unrest in South America,21 
and criminal terror in Central America have created a global refugee 
crisis.22 The rise of authoritarianism and a hard-edged form of 
conservative populism threaten the rule of law.23 A threat to the rule 
of law, in turn, is a challenge for economic growth, as fairness, 
consistency, and predictability in governance is directly correlated 
                                                                                                                 
 19. KOLBERT, supra note 9, at 92–110 (describing the impact of human behavior and technological 
change on the environment and climate); Marshall Burke & David Lobell, Climate Effects on Food 
Security, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOOD SECURITY: ADAPTING AGRICULTURE TO A WARMER WORLD 
13, 18–21 (Marshall Burke & David Lobell eds., 2010) (describing risks to food supply from climate 
change). 
 20. See Mark Lynch & Laurie Brand, Refugees and Displacement in the Middle East, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 29, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/refugees-
and-displacement-in-middle-east-pub-68479 [https://perma.cc/D439-PUZ2] (explaining that the wars in 
Syria and Iraq have yielded “the greatest share of the Middle East’s refugees in recent years” and that 
“North African states . . . have emerged as key transit hubs for refugee flows into Europe). 
 21. See Lucia Newman, Nicaragua Unrest: New Refugee Crisis Unfolding in Latin America, AL 
JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/nicaragua-unrest-refugee-crisis-
unfolding-latin-america-180805095729411.html [https://perma.cc/VN9Y-KN4F] (reporting that 23,000 
Nicaraguans have applied for asylum in Costa Rica to escape persecution in Nicaragua). 
 22. See Maya Averbuch, The Neverending Cycles of Central American Refugees, MEDIUM (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://medium.com/s/greatescape/the-neverending-cycles-of-central-american-refugees-
5f740f01bbe5 [https://perma.cc/E67P-S3YD] (explaining that many Central Americans flee to escape 
the criminal violence of gangs such as MS-13). 
 23. For a description of the components of the notion of the rule of law, see PAUL GOWDER, THE 
RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 7 (2016). The recent confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which raises questions about judicial independence and impartiality (two critical 
components of the rule of law), has been described as a threat to the rule of law. Roger Cohen, Opinion, 
An Insidious and Contagious American Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/trump-kavanaugh-confirmation-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/44JN-CD5C]. 
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with the economic health of a nation, as well as its long-term 
survival.24 Rapid technological change, which is a product of 
compounding technological innovation, is already remaking society 
and is likely to have dramatic effects on social and economic 
relations for generations.25 Whether it is autonomous vehicles, the 
Internet of Things, or Big Data and artificial intelligence, the rapid 
increase in computing power that has been unleashed could address 
some of the world’s problems, like pedestrian, passenger, and driver 
deaths from automobiles,26 but has also created new problems, like 
privacy breaches, cybersecurity, and threats of a drone or unmanned 
vehicle delivering a dirty bomb or, worse, a nuclear payload from a 
remote location on the other side of the planet.27 Rapid technological 
change has also remade the economic landscape and stands to alter 
the relationship of many workers to their employers, a shift we are 
already seeing in the sharing economy.28 Whether it is complete 
displacement from automation or a shift from regular employment to 
sporadic, contract, “on demand” work, the relationship of many of 
the world’s workers, in diverse fields such as truck transport, 
manufacturing, and even the law, are likely to see dramatic changes 
to the ways in which they relate to their employers and earn a living 
over the coming decades.29 Furthermore, as the evidence of the use of 
                                                                                                                 
 24. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, 
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 428–37 (2012). 
 25. STEVE CASE, THE THIRD WAVE: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S VISION OF THE FUTURE 185–200 (2016) 
(assessing the potential impact of technological change on economic development and economic 
opportunity); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S GUIDE TO 
THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 19–184 (2016) (describing the forces of computing power, 
the Internet, globalization, and climate change and their impact on the future). 
 26. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, 
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 190–202 (2014) (discussing the superiority 
of human intelligence and abilities compared to machine learning and artificial intelligence). 
 27. See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND GERMS, 
HACKERS AND DRONES: CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 1–10 (2015) (discussing the threats 
posed by new technologies for global security). 
 28. See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 26, at 204–45 (describing short- and long-term 
solutions for dealing with the technological change the authors predict for the immediate future). 
 29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 203–43 (identifying strategies for dealing with the impact of 
technology on employment); KELLY, supra note 8, at 29–60 (assessing the role of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence on employment opportunities in a range of industries); ALEC ROSS, THE 
INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 35–42 (2016) (discussing the role of automation and artificial intelligence 
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modern technologies like the Internet and social media to undermine 
elections in several democratic nations is overwhelming, it is 
apparent that sometimes the forces described abovelike 
authoritarianism, technological change, and threats to the rule of 
lawcompound each other. In this way, technological advances can 
support efforts to undermine the rule of law, exacerbating the threats 
to stability and democracy.30 Similarly, technological change is 
having a dramatic impact on economic well-being across the world, 
creating vast wealth for a few people and increasing inequality in 
some nations.31 These problems are all crying out for a solution, and 
lawyers are in the problem-solving business. 
For Gerald Lopez, “Lawyering means problem-solving.”32 
Similarly, for Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a lawyer is a “professional 
with formal legal training who employs law, as well as other relevant 
disciplines, to solve human problems and disputes, plan transactions, 
[and] prepare legal instruments and regulations . . . .”33 Lawyers 
                                                                                                                 
on employment prospects of various industries); RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE 
OF THE PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 45–99 
(2015) (discussing the role of technology on various professions, including the legal profession). For an 
assessment of the impact of these forces on the legal profession, see, for example, BENJAMIN H. 
BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 191–214 (2015) 
(discussing the role of technology in improving access to justice); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE 
WITH LAWYERS 9–10 (2015) (describing the “drivers of change” in the legal profession, including new 
technologies); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL 
SERVICES 98–141 (2010) (describing technologies that threaten to “disrupt” the legal profession). 
 30. See, e.g., Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-
facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/M6JH-NHR8]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, 
The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-
clinton.html [https://perma.cc/2GED-X8JM] (describing efforts of the government of the Russian 
Federation and private Russian forces to undermine the 2016 election in the United States);. 
 31. All of these forces also have a potential impact on economic inequality. See, e.g., JAMES 
BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, WAGES, AND WEALTH 
222–28 (2015) (discussing the role of social mobility and social role flexibility in labor’s adaptation to 
technological change as a way to address economic inequality brought about by technological change); 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 304–06 (2014) (discussing the interplay of 
technology, education, and inequality); DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, THROWING ROCKS AT THE GOOGLE BUS: 
HOW GROWTH BECAME THE ENEMY OF PROSPERITY 222–39 (2016) (describing ways technology can 
help combat economic inequality and foster sustainable prosperity). 
 32. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). 
 33. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Symposium, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: 
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often find themselves in the “problem space,” where they must either 
find solutions or make situations more complex to advance a client’s 
interest.34 According to Gary Blasi: “At bottom, lawyering entails 
solving (or making worse) problems of clients and others, under 
conditions of extraordinary complexity and uncertainty, in a virtually 
infinite range of settings.”35 The American Bar Association describes 
problem solving and legal analysis as the two “conceptual 
foundations for virtually all aspects of legal practice . . . .”36 But 
lawyers do more than bring mere technical skill to this problem 
space. As Paul Brest argues, a lawyer must certainly use her legal 
training and judgment to address a client’s problem; she must also 
understand the other constraints—like the political setting or the 
economic capacity with which a client operates—that bind the 
client’s actions.37 Indeed, as he and Linda Hamilton Krieger explain: 
“[F]inding the best solution—a solution that addresses all of the 
client’s concerns—usually requires more than technical legal skill.”38 
Lawyers thus solve client problems that have a legal component to 
them, taking into account a range of interests and needs in the pursuit 
of solutions that address those needs.39 
But what role does creativity play in lawyering and problem 
solving? According to Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck, 
creativity is one of the core lawyering skills that they have identified 
as essential to contemporary law practice.40 Legal problem solving 
                                                                                                                 
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–94 (1999). 
 34. Sometimes, lawyers, particularly social-change lawyers, make problems worse for their 
adversaries in order to gain leverage against their clients’ opponents. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What 
Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 313, 331 (1995) (describing how lawyers can solve problems or make them worse). 
 35. Id. at 317. 
 36. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 135 (1992) [hereinafter NARROWING THE GAP]. 
 37. See Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and 
Problem Solvers, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 8 (1995). 
 38. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Symposium, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. 
REV. 811, 811 (1999). 
 39. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 37, at 8. 
 40. See MARJORIE M. SHULTZ & SHELDON ZEDECK, IDENTIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
VALIDATION OF PREDICTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL LAWYERING 24–26 (2008). 
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tends to require some degree of creativity, regardless of the nature of 
the work involved.41 When engaging in creative problem solving, 
Menkel-Meadow argues that the lawyer uses analogy and metaphor, 
draws lessons and insights from other fields, “extend[s] a line of 
reasoning, principle or solution beyond its original purpose,” 
challenges conventional assumptions, deploys narrative, and reframes 
problems by looking at them from different perspectives.42 Another 
way to think about these approaches is that they represent what is 
sometimes called “lateral thinking”: moving beyond purely linear, 
analytical thought and shifting mental paradigms.43 Similar to 
Menkel-Meadow, Linda Morton has identified the characteristics of 
creative problem solving in the law as including a focus on the 
“underlying needs and interests . . . of individuals as well as society,” 
an analysis of the values at stake in a situation, including those of an 
individual but also society as a whole, the use of interdisciplinary 
resources, a focus on problem prevention, and “self-reflection and 
analysis.”44 
B.   Problem Solving and Social-Change Lawyering 
Although the problem-solving work of a lawyer often involves 
creativity, particularly when she is asked to solve complex problems, 
the lawyer who works for social change—however she defines that 
change—faces unique challenges that add another layer, or layers, of 
complexity to the lawyer’s work and the choices she must make.45 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and 
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 102–03 (2001). As Menkel-Meadow 
points out: “The creative legal problem solver . . . must learn to navigate within the seas of optimistic 
creativity, the swells of dynamic interaction with others (client and other counsel and parties) and the 
oceans of realistic legal possibility.” Id. at 103. 
 42. Id. at 122–25; see also BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY 
INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 135–37, 142–44 (2003) (exploring strategies for 
creative problem solving). 
 43. See EDWARD DE BONO, SERIOUS CREATIVITY: USING THE POWER OF LATERAL THINKING TO 
CREATE NEW IDEAS 15, 51–56 (1992). 
 44. Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 375, 378 (1998). 
 45. See William P. Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. 
JUST. 7, 10 (2007) (“Those who practice social justice law are essentially swimming upstream while 
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Social-change lawyers certainly must bring creativity to their work to 
solve the complex problems that they are often asked to solve, or 
have taken upon themselves to solve, but the role they assume when 
seeking to address social problems takes on new dimensions beyond 
those that traditional lawyers must address. 
1.   Social-Change Lawyers Work to Change the System 
The most important difference between a social-change lawyer and 
a traditional lawyer is that the social-change lawyer is generally 
working to change the legal infrastructure affecting her client’s life.46 
The traditional lawyer, by contrast, generally works within that 
infrastructure.47 Certainly, there are situations where a traditional 
lawyer might argue for a novel or creative take on a particular 
precedent to gain an advantage for a specific client, but the social-
change lawyer generally works for broader, societal change, and the 
novel or creative arguments about precedent can, at times, have 
tremendous impact on not just her client but society more broadly. 
The lawyers who argued Obergefell v. Hodges48 were claiming 
recognition of their clients’ marital relationships. A traditional lawyer 
might do that when seeking recognition of spousal support on behalf 
of a client. But the arguments the traditional lawyer might make are 
likely asking for recognition for the client within existing definitions 
of marital relations. The marriage-equality lawyers were arguing, 
similarly, for recognition of LGBTQ relationships using existing 
legal frameworks; in fact, that was the point of the marriage-equality 
effort.49 But, what that required was a new understanding of not just 
                                                                                                                 
others are on their way down.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, n.2 (1996) (describing social-change lawyering). 
 47. Even Alexis de Tocqueville, in his visits to early 19th century America, recognized the “general 
spirit” of the legal profession at the time as “eminently conservative and anti-democratic.” ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Knopf 3d ed. 
1946) (1835). 
 48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
 49. NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
TO AMERICA 7–8 (2017) (describing marriage equality movement’s demands); see also Molly Ball, The 
Marriage Plot: Inside This Year’s Epic Campaign for Gay Equality, ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2012), 
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marital relations but also the Equal Protection Clause itself.50 This is 
just one example of a situation in which the social-change lawyer is 
often arguing not inside the system but seeking to change the system 
itself, making her job much more complicated and challenging than 
that of the traditional lawyer in many instances.51 
2.   Social-Change Lawyers Must Strive to Empower Their 
Clients and Not Further Marginalize Them. 
Not only must social-change lawyers work to improve the lives of 
their clients and the communities in which they live, they must also 
strive to ensure that they are placing the clients out in front of the 
advocacy, thereby empowering them.52 The wave of legal advocates 
that emerged in the wake of the successes of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the work they 
shouldered on behalf of marginalized groups generated critiques of 
lawyer-driven advocacy.53 Some raised concerns that lawyer-driven 
advocacyoften focused on lawyer-centric strategies like 
litigationran the risk of disempowering grassroots groups and 
detracting from efforts to build grassroots campaigns and, ultimately, 
grassroots power.54 Moreover, some critics argued that these lawyer-
                                                                                                                 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/the-marriage-plot-inside-this-years-epic-campaign-
for-gay-equality/265865/ [https://perma.cc/C8UQ-U67D]. 
 50. FRANK, supra note 49, at 353 (describing marriage equality advocates’ equal protection 
arguments). 
 51. Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171, 176–82 (1993) (describing the 
types of changes the social-change lawyer pursues). 
 52. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructing Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 
100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2123–30 (1991) (describing the importance of client empowerment in social-
change advocacy). 
 53. The scholarship critiquing lawyer-driven advocacy is vast. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, 
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Richard L. 
Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 L. & POL’Y 5, 6 (1985); Binny Miller, Give Them Back 
Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 524–32 (1994) 
(arguing for the centrality of client voice in case development); Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 
5, 45–46 (1990). 
 54. Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
805, 806 (2008) (arguing that effective social-change efforts require coalition building). 
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driven strategies, on their own, fail to lead to lasting change.55 
Lasting change is difficult to achieve when efforts to promote social 
change do not fundamentally attack and alter existing power 
relations.56 Making matters worse, there is a threat that advocacy that 
places the lawyer at the center of the work can even further 
marginalize clients, typically by casting and treating the clients as 
victims rather than recognizing the potential of their own power as 
individuals and groups of individuals to pursue and obtain self-
determination, autonomy, and power.57 Thus, social-change lawyers 
should strive to put their client at the center of their work so as not to 
further marginalize them. Society does that enough. The traditional 
lawyer likely does not face similar challenges. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND 
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION 1 (1994); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: 
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 107–08 (1986); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 12 (2d ed. 2008); STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE xvii–xxv 
(1974); Abel, supra note 53, at 8; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental 
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 620–21, 661 (1992); 
Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1970). 
 56. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic 
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 688–89 (1987); Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, 
Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 31–33 (1985). 
 57. For the critique of lawyer-centric, social-change advocacy, see LÓPEZ, supra note 53, at 39; 
Alfieri, supra note 52, at 2110–11; White, supra note 53, at 20–21. For the argument that client-
empowerment strategies face their own limitations when these strategies must still take into account the 
social structures, and the limitations of those structures, within which clients find themselves, see Frank 
Munger, Rights in the Shadow of Class: Poverty, Welfare, and the Law, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 330, 336–37 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Gary L. Blasi, Symposium, 
What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 
1092 (1994); William H. Simon, Symposium, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment 
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1101–
02 (1994). As I have argued elsewhere: 
 Conscientious and committed progressive lawyers now struggle with these challenges: 
How to ensure that legal advocacy is meaningful to the lives of clients; that it is grounded 
in broader movements for political change; that it combines a range of tactics—direct 
services, mass mobilization, community education and law reform; that it is responsive to 
the day-to-day needs of the communities those lawyers serve; and that it takes into account 
the political realities in such a way that a legal victory in one arena will not be snuffed out 
by a political loss in another. 
Raymond H. Brescia, Line in the Sand: Progressive Lawyering, “Master Communities,” and a Battle 
for Affordable Housing in New York City, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 715, 727 (2010). 
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3.   Social-Change Lawyers Have Different Constraints in Case 
Selection 
There is also a unique financial component to the lawyer–client 
relationship that exists between the social-change lawyer and her 
clients when compared to that typically involved in the traditional 
lawyer–client relationship.58 This different relationship can have 
ramifications for the actions the lawyer takes, or does not take, on 
behalf of her client. In the typical lawyer–client relationship in the 
contemporary legal profession, the lawyer is paid on a fee-for-service 
basis, often at an hourly rate, and sometimes based on a flat fee 
depending on the service she provides.59 Sometimes a lawyer 
proceeds on a contingency-fee basis, where she bears the risk of an 
unsuccessful outcome and only receives compensation if she is 
successful on behalf of her client.60 Each of these relationships 
hinges on the economic relationship between the lawyer and the 
client; the client often makes decisions based on an economic 
calculus of whether it is worth it to proceed with the representation 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Thelton Henderson, Social Change, Judicial Activism, and the Public Lawyer, 12 WASH U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 33, 33–34 (2003). 
Traditional law firms will take your newly-minted diploma and your ability to think like a 
lawyer, . . . and they will train and mentor you. . . . The client will usually pay for at least a 
part, if not most, of that training through something with which we’re all familiar: the 
billable hour. 
If, however, you want to work for a legal aid office, or some other nonprofit public interest 
group that has scant resources, you might well receive a stack of files and find out that you 
are on your own to learn lawyering as you go, perhaps even by trial-and-error. There is 
virtually no budget in most of these operations for training new attorneys, and, of course, 
the billable hour is not applicable in this setting. 
Id. 
 59. John M. A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 95, 105–28 
(1995) (describing contours of traditional lawyer-client retainer agreements). 
 60. See When You Need a Lawyer—Legal Fees and Expenses, AM. B. ASS’N (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/lawyerfees
_contingent.html [https://perma.cc/LT97-RAKC]. The American Bar Association explains contingency 
fees as follows: 
In a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer agrees to accept a fixed percentage (often 
one[-]third) of the recovery, which is the amount finally paid to the client. If you win the 
case, the lawyer’s fee comes out of the money awarded to you. If you lose, neither you nor 
the lawyer will get any money, but you will not be required to pay your attorney for the 
work done on the case. 
Id. 
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based on—to put it crudely—how much justice she can afford.61 
Thus, critical tactical decisions may come down to whether the client 
wishes to pay for the service offered by the lawyer.62 A client may 
wish to spare no expense and give the lawyer great freedom to make 
tactical decisions, regardless of the cost.63 The client may choose 
certain tactics based solely on a cost-benefit calculus of the likely 
gains possible through the use of different tactics and the potential 
outcomes and risks associated with those tactics.64 Of course, though 
cost may impact the tactical choices a lawyer might make on behalf 
of a client, with the decisions about those choices made with the 
client’s cost consciousness in mind, it is also entirely possible that the 
lawyer and client may have no tactical choices to make because the 
client foregoes legal representation altogether based on the perceived 
costs associated with that representation and the likely benefits that 
might accrue, or, more simply, because she cannot afford any level of 
service from the lawyer.65 Indeed, many Americans face their legal 
problems without a lawyer, with cost being one of the main 
contributing factors to their decision to proceed or not to proceed 
with representation.66 In many ways, this is a relatively easy decision. 
The client consults with the lawyer, makes a decision on the likely 
                                                                                                                 
 61. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 244–45 (2006) 
(describing cartoon that originally ran in the New Yorker in which a lawyer asks his client, “You’ve got 
a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can you afford?”). 
 62. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1789–90 (2001) 
(explaining that defendants who hire their own counsel are often no better off than if they had been 
represented by a public defender because those individuals are typically only slightly better off than the 
indigent). 
 63. John T. Woodall, Commonsense Principles of Civil Litigation, 52 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 38 
(1994) (describing lawyer-client decision-making around expenses in litigation). 
 64. Robert P. Burns & Steven Lubet, Division of Authority Between Attorney and Client: The Case 
of the Benevolent Otolaryngologist, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1294–96 (2003) (discussing the poorly 
defined boundaries between ends and means). For the tension in civil rights litigation when representing 
groups of clients in navigating these poorly defined boundaries, see generally William B. Rubenstein, 
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights 
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997). 
 65. On the deliberations around ends and means between the lawyer and her client, see, for example 
ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 132–34 (1995). 
 66. On the reasons why Americans often forego legal representation, with cost being just one such 
reason, see REBECCA SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS FROM 
THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 12–13 (2014). 
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costs and potential benefits of representation, and decides how she 
would like the lawyer to proceed.67 
In the social-change context, the calculus is often much different. 
There is certainly some small degree of overlap in the approaches 
used by some social-change lawyers and those used in traditional 
settings. With certain social-change-oriented fields of practicelike 
employment discrimination, employee wage-and-hour rights, police 
brutality actions, and social security benefitssocial-change lawyers 
may operate from within the private bar, charging contingency fees 
for their work and taking a portion of the award they may win on 
behalf of their clients or earning remuneration through fee-shifting 
provisions in the statutes governing the claims.68 At the same time, 
the possibility of contingency-fee arrangements often crowds out the 
work of the social-change lawyer, who might make strategic 
decisions about the types of cases she tends to take based on whether 
a particular client might have other options for representation based 
on the availability of lawyers from the private bar willing to take the 
client’s case through a contingency-fee-based retainer.69 
But in other fieldswhere there are few contingency-fee 
opportunities, where the private bar might see the client’s claim as 
too risky to take (even on contingency), or where fee-shifting might 
not be availablethe social-change lawyer will typically work in a 
                                                                                                                 
 67. On some of the elements of the decision to accept a client for representation in the traditional 
lawyer-client setting, see generally W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in 
Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (2006). 
 68. On the role of fee-shifting statutes in civil rights litigation, see, for example, Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980). For a description of recent developments in the jurisprudence around fee-
shifting in civil rights cases, see generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural 
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1087 (2007). 
 69. In addition to the desire to serve only the client who may not have private options available to 
her for representation, a nonprofit group may experience some resistance from the private bar upon 
which it relies for donations should it take on cases that may generate fees. What is more, legal services 
organizations funded by the U.S. Legal Services Corporation face a bar on accepting fee-generating 
cases. On some of the tensions around nonprofit organizations and some of these issues around fees, see, 
for example, Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law 
Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 
82–85 (2014). 
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nonprofit legal services provider, whether that provider is a small, 
local organization that addresses local concerns, or a large, national 
organization that seeks to promote a national agenda in a particular 
field.70 Indeed, the diversity of issues that nonprofit lawyers address 
is quite large, from animal rights and environmental justice to claims 
on behalf of the transgender community and the rights of low-wage 
immigrant workers.71 For lawyers not operating in fields typically 
dominated by paying clients, or clients who can be served through 
contingency-fee arrangements, lawyers face a different calculus when 
it comes to the costs associated with providing representation.72 They 
must find funding to provide the representation, and that funding 
might come from a government entity, a private foundation, or a 
private donor.73 Although the decision to take on a case in the 
traditional lawyer–client relationship may come down to whether a 
particular client will pay for the services that she will receive from 
the lawyer, in the social-change setting, the lawyer must make a 
different calculation: whether the case is one that fits within the 
constraints that may be imposed by the donor or the source of 
funds.74 If the source is a government entity, the client must fit within 
the constraints imposed by that source, which is typically a function 
of the income of the client or the nature of the case.75 If the source of 
the funds that might allow the representation of the client is a private 
foundation or an individual donor, the lawyer must ensure she 
provides services consistent with the donor’s intent.76 
                                                                                                                 
 70. For a description of the activities of public interest legal organizations, see generally, Deborah L. 
Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2017 (2008). 
 71. On the range of goals of various public interest legal organizations, see id. at 2036–37. 
 72. See Carrie Johnson, Legal Help for the Poor in ‘State of Crisis,’ NPR (June 15, 2012, 3:57 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/06/15/154925376/legal-help-for-the-poor-in-state-of-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/DE3T-MZ32]. 
 73. For a discussion of the different sources of funding for public interest legal organizations, see 
Rhode, supra note 70, at 2054–58. 
 74. On the priority-setting process in public interest legal organizations and the role of funders in 
influencing that process, see Rhode, supra note 70, at 2049–53. 
 75. See Rhode, supra note 62, at 1787. 
 76. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW 
87 (2003) (arguing that “[f]unding legal work for social justice remains a political battleground in at 
least three major areas . . . : the adequacy of resources to the need; the constitutionality of restrictions on 
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The decision to represent a particular client in a particular case is 
not made simply on whether the client fits within the confines 
imposed by the sources of funds that the organization receives. 
Although that is certainly a baseline requirement—i.e., the lawyer’s 
organization typically must have funding to provide the services—the 
organization will also take into account other concerns when 
considering whether to take on the case. In a world of scarce 
resources, legal organizations may impose a sort of “lifeboat” ethics 
when making decisions with respect to which cases to take.77 The 
degree of complexity of the case may make it so resource intensive 
that the decision to accept the case might mean that the organization 
is unable to accept other clients who might also fit within the 
categories of cases that the organization handles. If, for example, the 
lawyer takes on a complicated eviction case, then, even if she were to 
save the client’s apartment, that representation might mean that three 
other families go without representation and face eviction as a result. 
Lawyers in these situations must make decisions about which cases 
to take based on some rubric of cost, merit, resources required, likely 
benefits that might flow from the representation, and the opportunity 
cost associated with rejecting other clients.78 Although these 
decisions come down to resource constraints and cost-benefits 
analyses, not unlike the factors that weigh on the client in the 
traditional attorney–client relationship, the social-change lawyer and 
the organization in which she works typically make the decision 
whether to accept the case for representation. This, unlike in the 
traditional lawyer–client relationship where the cost-benefit analysis 
is made by the client, adds a layer of complexity to the work that is 
                                                                                                                 
lawyers who are funded by the government to serve poor clients; and the constitutionality of additional 
sources of funding for services for low-income people raised through legislation”). 
 77. On so-called “lifeboat ethics” in the context of climate change, see Garrett Hardin, Living on a 
Lifeboat, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 210–25 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2d ed. 
1998). 
 78. For a discussion of opportunity costs, see generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). 
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mostly not present in the traditional setting.79 A private lawyer 
certainly may make the decision that despite a client’s desire for 
representation, the lawyer may not take on the case, based on her 
present workload or other factors.80 These decisions do not take on 
the same degree of complexity in the social-change setting. They 
may not take on the same moral or social weight either. A private 
lawyer turning down a paying client probably can rest assured that 
that client will find another lawyer to represent her; that is not 
always, or even often, the case with the social-change lawyer.81 
Moreover, for the social-change lawyer, there is often another 
aspect of the decision to take on a case: whether a particular client’s 
case presents itself as a vehicle for furthering the lawyer’s social-
change goals or agenda.82 In other words, one client’s case may offer 
the lawyer an opportunity to advance the social-change goals that she 
wants to pursue. The factors that go into the decision as to whether a 
particular case might advance the social change the lawyer wants to 
see are often quite complex, offering another degree of complexity to 
legal advocacy for social change.83 For many social-change lawyers, 
as with any lawyers, the primary issue they must face when deciding 
whether they can take a case is often, first, whether the case has merit 
                                                                                                                 
 79. For a discussion of some of the considerations that go into the decision to accept or reject cases 
in the nonprofit, social-change context, see Paul R. Tremblay, A “Very Moral Type of God”: Triage 
Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999). One tension facing a lawyer engaged in 
eviction defense work may entail when she is asked to defend a case involving allegations that a client is 
engaged in drug trafficking or sale. Id. at 2519. Putting aside problems of proof, racial profiling, the 
notion that every defendant is entitled to due process and access to justice, and over-policing in and 
prosecution of members of certain communities for the distribution and sale of particular narcotics, is 
the vigorous defense of an actual and violent drug dealer in the best interests of the community, and the 
other tenants, a lawyer might serve? As a former legal services attorney who often represented tenant 
associations in large tenement buildings, my group clients would often resist my efforts to provide 
representation to tenants who they felt may endanger the safety of the other residents in their building. 
 80. For a discussion of some of the pressures on public interest lawyers, at least in the context of a 
public defender’s office, that affect the acceptance of cases, see, for example, AM. BAR. ASS’N, TEN 
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002). 
 81. See Tremblay, supra note 79, at 2475. 
 82. See generally Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revising the Old Neighborhood, 32 
COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000), reprinted in MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 76, at 182–83 (noting 
that a “lawyer is constrained both by codes of professional responsibility and ethical considerations, 
which may restrict the lawyer’s ability or willingness to advocate such a course”). 
 83. Id. at 181. 
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and second, whether the lawyer thinks she can win it. But whether 
one can win the case is often, itself, a question involving a highly 
complicated calculus, as is the case with all lawyering. For the 
social-change lawyer, however, even defining what a win is can be 
complicated.84 The lawyer may score a moral victory, delay an 
eviction or deportation, or apply enough political pressure on a 
government agency that it decides to change a policy even when that 
policy is upheld by the courts.85 Some of these same considerations 
may play into the traditional lawyer’s calculus, but the decision to 
proceed is often left to the client in that setting. In the social-change 
setting, the lawyer will have to balance the interest of the client 
before her, the interest of the broader community in seeing the policy 
challenged, and the interests of the funders of the organization in 
seeing activity consistent with the organizational goals that the 
funder supports. These other interests may weigh on the social-
change lawyer in other ways as well, which introduces considerations 
that the traditional lawyer does not typically face.86 
4.   Social-Change Lawyers Face Different Opportunity Costs 
Related to the Trade-Off between Direct Services and Law-
Reform Activities 
Another aspect of social-change lawyering that emerges in the face 
of resource constraints is that to pursue a long-term legal strategy, 
when resources are committed to that strategy (toward what is often 
                                                                                                                 
 84. For the public interest lawyer, defining what a win is may be difficult, but identifying the direct 
and even the indirect effects of legal strategies can also be complex. In his landmark work, Rights at 
Work, Michael McCann described some of the indirect effects of legal strategies as their ability to 
mobilize constituents, frame a consciousness among group members, and build infrastructure within a 
movement, among others. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 280–84 (1994). 
 85. In social movement lawyering, a lawyer and the client or clients that she represents can also gain 
movement, momentum and strength by losing in the courts. For a reflection on this dynamic, see 
generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011). 
 86. On the tension that sometimes exists between representing particular clients, meeting an 
institution’s social-change goals, and addressing the needs of the broader community, see, for example, 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976). 
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called law reform), that necessarily means that these resources are 
channeled away from direct services that might solve a particular 
client’s immediate problem without addressing larger social-change 
goals.87 Although long- and short-term strategies do not need to be in 
tension, they can be when an organization does not have the 
resources to do both, and it must choose between law reform and 
other similar strategies and emergency, direct, and atomized services 
to individual clients.88 When members of the community face real 
harm in the absence of legal interventions, social-change lawyers can 
face a devastating choice: prevent an eviction, defend against the loss 
of custody of a child, or secure public-assistance benefits on the one 
hand, or, on the other hand, pursue strategies that might restructure 
the legal relationships over time, such that fewer members of the 
community face these harrowing outcomes.89 In some ways, these 
choices may have become less complex for some lawyers because 
they have fewer choices to make: cutbacks to federal funding for 
legal-services programs and restrictions imposed on the funding 
mean that lawyers in programs receiving funds from this source are 
able to serve fewer clients and have fewer tactical choices to choose 
from.90 This means that lawyers who do not face these restrictions 
                                                                                                                 
 87. For a description of this tension between law-reform strategies and the provision of direct 
services in social-change advocacy, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE 
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 33–34 (1993). For an argument that effective social-
change advocacy should couple targeted, individual case representation with organizing and legislative 
reform, see Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA 
BRIEFCASE 106, 122 (1977). 
 88. On navigating the tension between engaging in impact litigation and delivering meaningful 
services to individual clients, see DAVIS, supra note 87, at 33. 
 89. In recent years, organizations have begun to use long-term legal and political strategies while 
also addressing the day-to-day needs of their clients. For a description of one organization, the 
Workplace Project in New York state, see JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT 
FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 78–79 (2009). 
 90. On the funding cutbacks and programmatic restrictions on federal legal services grantees, see 
ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 36–37 (2007), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/publication-1/0158.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FUM4-NHYW] (describing restrictions); Rhode, supra note 70, at 2038. On the 
tensions over LSC-funded law reform efforts and direct services, see William P. Quigley, The Demise of 
Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 
1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241, 241–42 (1998). 
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have more clients to choose from (meaning greater complexity and 
choices), even as the overwhelming majority of low-income people 
face their legal problems without legal assistance.91 
5.   Social-Change Lawyering Often Involves Complex Goals 
Putting aside the questions of how resources should be deployed in 
the service of social change and whether lawyers should choose 
between direct services and longer-term strategies, there are often 
other larger interests that the social-change lawyer must weigh in the 
decision to take on a case.92 If the cause she promotes is a goal 
identified by a particular community-based organization or the 
expansion of rights for a particular social or demographic group, 
taking on a case, pressing certain rights, and bringing them to the 
attention of the courts and the general public can sometimes 
undermine the long-term interests of the cause that the lawyer 
supports. This can spark a backlash and a retrenchment of rights 
through the adoption of legislation that undermines any victory that 
the lawyer may achieve in the courts, either through the acts of a 
hostile legislature or an electorate willing to adopt a ballot initiative 
to scale back or reverse the lawyer’s victories.93 In the marriage-
equality context, lawyers won victories in the state courts in several 
states only to have those victories undermined by legislative action 
                                                                                                                 
 91. By some estimates, eighty percent of the legal needs of the indigent, and forty to sixty percent of 
the legal needs of the middle class, go unmet. See, e.g., ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE (1996) 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads
/agendaforaccess.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YCZ-C7UG] (describing legal needs of 
moderate-income Americans); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12–13 (2000) (describing unmet legal needs of 
the poor); ROY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME AND 
MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS 
STUDY 7–17 (1994) (describing legal needs of low- and moderate-income households). Deborah Rhode 
argues that it is likely that these studies likely underestimate the true scope of the unmet legal needs of 
these populations. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 397–98 (2004). 
 92. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the 
Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1934–35 (1999). 
 93. Id. at 1932 (“[C]ause lawyers must continually threaten and challenge dominant understandings 
of the professional role and the larger process within which that role is performed.”). 
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and ballot initiatives.94 Thus, when considering the interests of the 
client that presents herself for representation to the social-change 
lawyer, that lawyer often must balance the interests of that client 
against other interests.95 However, once the lawyer accepts the case 
for representation, these other interests should generally factor less in 
the decisions that transpire throughout the course of the 
representation. But, before the lawyer agrees to accept the 
representation of the client, these issues will likely weigh heavily on 
her decision to proceed or not to proceed with the case.96 
6.   Social-Change Lawyers Must Often Choose Between More 
Complex Tactics in Pursuit of Complex Goals 
If a lawyer decides to take on the case, another decision that the 
lawyer must make in the social-change setting, often in consultation 
with the client, is the tactics she will deploy in proceeding with the 
representation. In the traditional attorney–client relationship, these 
decisions might present themselves in a more straightforward way. 
The client wants to purchase property. She wants to sue over a breach 
of contract. The goals are often more discrete and more easily 
identifiable in these traditional settings. For the social-change lawyer, 
the goals she might pursue may be more amorphous and present 
more challenging problems to solve.97 The lawyer’s social-change 
objectives might include improving the treatment of a particular 
social group generally or protecting a community from a particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, & the Politics of Gun Litigation, in 
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 152, 
166 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (describing legislative backlash after gun control lawsuits filed 
against gun manufacturers). 
 95. On the tension between client and other interests in social-change lawyering, see Bell, supra note 
86, at 488–93; Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 147, 158–59 (2000). 
 96. There is an extensive scholarship on public interest intake decisions, much of which is collected 
in Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2595–618 (1993). 
 97. For a discussion of cause lawyering, see Anna-Maria Marshall & Daniel Crocker Hale, Cause 
Lawyering, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 301, 307 (2014) (“A poor person whose heat is turned off is 
exposed to the risks and vagaries of the legal system in a way that an advocacy organization promoting 
prayer in school is not. These factors shape the nature of the clients’ interactions with the cause lawyers 
who represent them.”). 
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destructive government or business practice. The goals and the tactics 
that one might use to achieve them may not present themselves in an 
obvious fashion. When the goals are themselves less defined, the 
lawyer will often find that choosing among tactics is more complex. 
The lawyer, in consultation with the client, will likely weigh the 
potential costs and benefits of the different tactics to achieve the 
overarching goals of the representation, introducing even more 
complexity into the situation.98 
7.   Social-Change Lawyers May Find It Difficult to Identify the 
Client. 
There is another layer of complexity beyond defining the goals of 
the representation or the tactics used to achieve them. Indeed, social-
change lawyering sometimes involves debate over identifying the 
client in each situation.99 Is the client the individual or group who 
presents himself, herself, or itself to the lawyer for representation? Or 
is the client someone or some group that the lawyer has identified as 
a strategic partner serving to advance the cause that the lawyer seeks 
to further?100 Sometimes the social-change lawyer goes out in search 
of the appropriate client who may serve as a participant in the social-
change strategy because that idealized and sought-after client’s 
situation is sympathetic or compelling. The client’s situation may 
offer a salient narrative that illuminates the plight of those whose 
situations the social-change lawyer wants to improve. It may also 
present facts that help garner support from the courts, policymakers, 
or legislators whom the lawyer may need to convince to embrace and 
                                                                                                                 
 98. For a discussion of the lawyer’s role in these situations, see generally William L.F. Felstiner, 
Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). 
 99. Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 25, 31–34 (2011) (discussing models of litigation on behalf of groups of individuals and 
tensions that can arise in social-change lawyering). 
 100. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspective on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 207, 234 (1976) (“[W]hen a public interest firm identifies a critical issue, it rarely has any 
difficulty in finding a client willing to pursue the matter.”). 
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advance the cause.101 This search for the client or clients that help fill 
this narrative role might mean that the client in these settings may 
assume a different role than one in the traditional lawyer–client 
relationship.102 Contemporary legal ethics requires even the social-
change lawyer to maintain a relationship with every client such that 
the client controls the critical ends of the representation.103 When the 
lawyer may have a different sense of who the client is in any given 
situationwhether it is the person who is the nominal representative 
plaintiff in a class action, the community that the individual 
represents, or someone or some other entity or groupthe lawyer’s 
sense of whom she serves may change. The social-change lawyer 
may thus perceive that she is entitled to have a different relationship 
with a specific client in a particular matter because the social-change 
lawyer might see a living, breathing client as representing some 
larger cause or interest. This then means that the process of 
identifying the clients’ interests and needs, and the tactics the lawyer 
should pursue, becomes more complex, and the lawyer, whether or 
not we like it, must try to understand who the client is, what the client 
wants, and how the lawyer should proceed on the client’s behalf. But 
all of that depends on how the lawyer defines the client. When the 
client is an amorphous group like “the community,” with no clear 
spokesperson or constituent who can provide guidance to the lawyer 
as to the interests and preferred tactics of the client, the process of 
identifying both who the client is and how the lawyer should proceed 
becomes more challenging.104 Admittedly, some lawyers may feel 
that this gives them license to proceed as they see fit, substituting 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Marshall & Hale, supra note 97, at 312 (arguing that “many cause lawyers enjoy more 
collaborative relationships with their clients . . . [the] clients . . . tend to be social movement 
organizations, for whom additional resources may be helpful in directing their attorneys’ energies”). 
 102. See id. (“These organizational practices may draw cause lawyers into the ambit of activism, 
where they share in a movement’s collective identity, and that identity, in turn, shapes the way that 
cause lawyers practice law. “). 
 103. See generally Marshall, supra note 95. For a discussion of some of the legal ethics issues that 
arise in group settings, see Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving 
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–305 (2015). 
 104. For an exploration of some of these issues, see generally Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who’s in 
Charge Anyway? A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831 (1998). 
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their sense of what that undefined, incorporeal “client” wants; for 
other lawyers, who truly want to ensure that they proceed with the 
interests of a client or clients at the center of what they do, that 
process becomes only harder, not easier.105 
C.   What Complexity Means for Social-Change Lawyers 
When comparing the social-change lawyer’s role to that of what I 
have called a traditional lawyers, it would appear that there is some 
greater level of complexity that adds to the general complexity of the 
problem that the lawyer is attempting to address. The decision to 
accept or reject a client often has different components in the social-
change context when compared to that decision in the traditional, 
private relationship. In fact, that identity of the client may itself shift 
when the lawyer is engaged in social-change lawyering. In turn, that 
shift in the identity of the client means that the considerations and 
factors that a lawyer must weigh are also different and more 
complex.106 So, the additional complexity often centers around which 
clients to accept for representation, which strategies to deploy to 
achieve their goals, the tactics to use in pursuing those strategies, the 
direction the lawyer should take, and whom to take direction from 
when pursuing those tactics and strategies. To a certain extent, some 
of these decisions play a role in the traditional lawyer–client 
relationship, but generally, they involve a greater deal of complexity 
in the social-change context. This complexity brings new dimensions 
to problem solving in this type of advocacy, requiring a greater 
degree of creativity from the social-change lawyer in pursuing 
solutions to the problems. 
Despite these additional considerations that lawyers working for 
social change have faced when engaging in creative problem solving 
for their clients (however they define those clients), lawyers have 
long played roles in attempting to help engineer social change. The 
unsuccessful litigation that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 857–58. 
 106. Id. at 856–57. 
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Plessy v. Ferguson, which enshrined the doctrine of “separate but 
equal,” was in many ways the product of the type of legal campaign 
that became commonplace by the 1970s.107 The prominent role that 
lawyers played in the Civil Rights Movement helped to serve as a 
model for efforts of progressive lawyers that have sought to promote 
environmental protection, women’s rights, the rights of different 
racial and ethnic groups such as the Latinx and Asian-American 
communities, and LGBTQ rights.108 It also prompted the rise of 
conservative legal organizations that promoted a probusiness or 
libertarian agenda through the courts.109 
With some degree of urgency, there is a growing understanding 
that the law must be used to promote social justice and social change, 
but there is also an emerging appreciation for the fact that there is not 
just one way to use the law to promote social justice and that those 
who would use the law to do so must be sensitive to community 
needs. This work is thus not only tactically flexible “but also 
responsive and accountable to community interests and needs.”110 
Scott Cummings describes this reemergence, with a focus on 
advocates seeking to promote workers’ rights, as follows: “[L]abor 
activists have, in fact, begun to leverage a broader range of legal 
regimes to advance multiple labor goals, from direct worker 
mobilization to the protection and expansion of unionized 
industries.”111 They have done this by filing suits pressing 
international human rights claims “to mobilize immigrant 
workers,”112 bringing land use claims “in an effort to block big-box 
                                                                                                                 
 107. For a discussion about the effort of early social-change lawyers to challenge Jim Crow, 
unsuccessfully, in the campaign that ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 28–60 
(1988). 
 108. For an overview of the role of some of these identity-based groups on social change, see 
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
 109. On the emergence of conservative legal organizations, see generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, 
LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 1–2 (2008). 
 110. Brescia, supra note 57, at 727. 
 111. Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop 
Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 112. Id. 
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retailers from entering markets dominated by unionized groceries,”113 
and “threatened environmental lawsuits”114 to strengthen their 
negotiating position when seeking “community benefit agreements 
with labor-friendly provisions.”115 Cummings argues that this 
suggests that “a more fundamental reorientation is under way within 
the labor movement”116 because activists are adopting what he calls a 
“legal pluralist”117 approach, which recognizes the many ways in 
which the law interacts with the employer-employee relationship to 
“leverage the power of law to advance labor goals.”118 This work is 
thus a “more politically integrated, tactically versatile model of legal 
practice,”119 where legal victories are only “moments in broader 
campaigns to stimulate collective action and leverage political 
reform”120 as opposed to ends in themselves. As Cummings further 
explains, litigation affords advocates just “one of many problem[-
]solving tools,” and clients are “allies to be educated and empowered 
for future struggles.”121 Other scholars have identified the ways in 
which low-wage worker legal advocacy has embraced this 
accountable and tactically pluralistic approach.122 
This embrace is also evident in the housing context.123 In my own 
work and research, I was a part of, and attempted to assess, the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cummings, supra note 111, at 5. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Id. (citation omitted). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 72 
(2005) (describing work of the Workplace Project in Hempstead, New York); Sameer M. Ashar, Law 
Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 391–93 (2008) (describing legal 
advocacy with restaurant workers in New York City); Cummings, supra note 111, at 9–61 (describing 
the attempt to provide representation to sweatshop workers in Los Angeles). 
 123. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charne, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on Feldman’s 
Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633 app. 2 at 1664–68 (1995) (describing “Eviction 
Free Zone” in Massachusetts); Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for 
Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 913 (2009) (describing legal advocacy in support of tenant 
association in Los Angeles); Brescia, supra note 57, at 716–17 (describing effort to preserve affordable 
housing in New York City through the use of a range of legal tactics); Judith E. Koons, Fair Housing 
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coordinated effort to fight the radical transformation of what were 
once middle-class and working poor housing developments in New 
York City, Peter Cooper Village, and Stuyvesant Town, into luxury 
housing for the very rich.124 That effortwhich combined 
community education, grassroots organizing, direct services through 
brief advice and assistance and direct representation, and an 
affirmative class action caseultimately prevented the conversion of 
affordable housing to unaffordable housing.125 This was done in a 
tactically pluralistic way in collaboration with a range of community 
partners, including an engaged, local elected official, a robust tenant 
association, and nonprofit lawyers and private lawyers working on 
contingency.126 That work showed that lawyers from different 
backgrounds and experiences had a range of tactics to bring about 
important social change or at least prevent an erosion of significant 
economic rights from befalling the residents of these 
developments.127 This required effective coalition building and 
efficient delivery of targeted, customized, and focused representation 
and assistance to balance the need for direct services that would 
prevent displacement while bringing tactical affirmative litigation to 
ensure the protection of broader comprehensive rights for the 
collective benefit of the residents of these developments. This tactical 
pluralism provided effective relief and required creativity in terms of 
pulling together both the different strands of the services to be 
provided as well as the individuals and organizations that would 
provide them. The complex problem of preserving affordable 
housing required innovative legal and advocacy strategies, as well as 
a diverse team of stakeholders and service providers, to bring about a 
successful outcome.128 
                                                                                                                 
and Community Empowerment: Where the Roof Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 
75, 87–95 (1996) (describing techniques utilized to prevent housing displacement due to urban 
redevelopment). 
 124. Brescia, supra note 57, at 716–17. 
 125. See id. at 717 (describing campaign). 
 126. Id. at 716–17. 
 127. Id. at 717. 
 128. Id. 
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The work of labor rights activists and the housing lawyers 
involved in the effort to defend affordable housing in New York City 
shows that lawyers engaged in problem solving in pursuit of social 
change face additional creative challenges that add new dimensions 
to their work when compared to the work of traditional lawyers. 
Despite these challenges, as the following Part shows using just three 
examples (though there are many more from which to choose), 
lawyers working for social change have helped bring about dramatic 
change by playing a role in reforming the legal institutions that 
structure the relations between individuals, communities, broader 
society, and the government. Lawyers have helped spark meaningful 
change in terms of improving civil, political, and human rights for 
countless millions of Americans.129 Thus, lawyers have found ways 
to confront the complexities associated with social-change lawyering 
with creativity and zeal, helping to advance new understandings of 
the United States Constitution, the laws, and social relations in the 
United States.130 I will highlight lessons we can learn from the 
examples of these successful efforts to bring about positive social 
change, particularly efforts which involved creative solutions to 
solving complex social problems. The next section uses three 
examples of lawyers playing a role in addressing complex social 
problems through legal advocacy to identify some of the common 
approaches and themes of these lawyers. 
II.   Lawyering for Social Change 
This Part describes the role that lawyers played in three moments 
of significant social change in the United States: the effort to combat 
slavery, the decades-long struggle for civil rights for African 
Americans, and the campaign for marriage equality for members of 
the LGBTQ community. In the first example, much larger forces 
played a greater role in ultimately bringing about an end to slavery. 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See infra Part II. 
 130. See generally COLE, supra note 7 (describing several legal advocacy campaigns in recent 
decades). 
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Yet, lawyers played an important role in addressing the treatment of 
slaves in the law, particularly escaped slaves, and that approach 
helped inform the larger effort to end slavery.131 In the Civil Rights 
Movement and the effort to attain marriage equality, lawyers played 
central roles (and at least in the Civil Rights Movement, subsequent 
critiques have argued that their role was too central).132 In each of 
these examples, however, the lawyers’ work did not operate in a 
vacuum. All of the lawyers were sensitive to forces playing out in the 
wider world, brought in other disciplines to support their efforts, and 
sought to form broad coalitions. What follows is a description of each 
of these three examples of lawyers working for social change. 
Subsequent parts explore some common themes that emerge from 
this analysis as well as what this analysis might say about creative 
lawyering for social change now and in the future. 
A.   Lawyers and the Abolition of Slavery in the United States 
The first example to explore recounts the efforts of two lawyers 
who played roles in the effort to end slavery in the United States: one 
famous and one not-so-famous. Of course, lawyers had a significant 
hand in crafting the laws that first enshrined slavery in the United 
States Constitution133 and then in the many legislative compromises 
and proposals that ultimately proved unsuccessful in either 
maintaining or ending slavery, with the failure of the efforts to end 
slavery peaceably ultimately leading to the United States Civil 
War.134 One of the main tensions between the Northern and Southern 
states was the Fugitive Slave Act, which had been updated as part of 
the package of legislative measures that became the Compromise of 
1850.135 The 1850 version of the law allowed any slave holder whose 
                                                                                                                 
 131. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 159 (1975). 
 132. See, e.g., Bell, Jr., supra note 86, at 490, n.59. 
 133. JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (2018) (describing 
makeup of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, including roughly half of those in attendance being 
lawyers). 
 134. Id. 
 135. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 78–88 (describing 
Fugitive Slave Law as part of the Compromise of 1850 and the tensions that arose from it). 
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slave escaped to a free state or territory to petition federal authorities 
to return that slave to his or her master.136 Riots would sometimes 
occur in free states when federal authorities would move in to 
enforce the law because abolitionists would seek to protect the 
escaped slave from a return to bondage.137 
With the outbreak of the Civil War, a question remained whether a 
slave holder from a Confederate state (or even a non-seceding slave 
state like Maryland) could enforce the law despite the open 
hostilities.138 An abolitionist general in the Union Army in the 
Western theater, John C. Frémont, issued a military proclamation 
freeing the slaves of any slave holder in Missouri who took up arms 
in rebellion.139 Abolitionists cheered this move, but conservatives in 
the north did not approve of it. President Abraham Lincoln was 
concerned that these efforts might alienate border states that still 
recognized slavery. Ultimately, Frémont rescinded the order.140 
Another Union officer, Benjamin Butler, a lawyer-turned-general 
who was commanding Fort Monroea Union garrison in northern 
Virginiatook a slightly different approach. This creative approach 
helped advance the abolitionist cause on firmer ground than 
Frémont’s efforts had done.141 When three slaves who had been 
forced to assist the Confederate forces in building breastworks across 
the river from the Union fortress slipped away under the cover of 
darkness behind Union lines and presented themselves to Butler, he 
was forced to confront the applicability and enforceability of the 
Fugitive Slave Act. Butler seems to have had a complicated view of 
slavery.142 Because he was a northern Democrat before the war, some 
paint him as an abolitionist, and others reveal he very much feared 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) (repealed 1864). On the role of judges in 
enforcing the fugitive slave laws, see generally COVER, supra note 131. 
 137. See Roy E. Finkenbine, Christiana Riot (1851), in SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, 
POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (VOL. I) 222 (Junius P. Rodriguez, ed., 2007) for an 
account of one riot. 
 138. Id. 
 139. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 198 (2012). 
 140. Id. at 202. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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that free slaves might, if armed, rise up in rebellion and strike out 
mercilessly against slave owners and their families.143 
Nevertheless, as any self-respecting lawyer should do when faced 
with whether to apply a law to a particular situation, he consulted the 
text of the Fugitive Slave Act.144 For Butler, a plain reading of the 
law seemed to require that a slave owner residing in a slave state 
could petition federal authorities for return of an escaped slave.145 
But, Butler read the law literally, and took into account the position 
of the slave states, those in open rebellion like Virginia, from which 
these slaves had escaped.146 That position held that Virginia, because 
it had claimed that it seceded from the Union, was no longer a 
state.147 And if it was no longer a state, a slave owner from Virginia 
could no longer claim rights under the Fugitive Slave Act.148 
Moreover, Butler took into account the role the slaves had played 
in supporting the enemy troops across the river. They had been 
dragooned into helping to build fortifications opposing the Union 
position and thus had supported the Confederate war effort.149 
Logically, if Butler had come across a cache of Confederate 
gunpowder or cannons, it would be preposterous to expect that he 
would return “contraband” of war to the rebel forces. Butler claimed 
that the slaves were no different; they too were contraband, and he 
would not return them to the Southern side.150 Again, Butler used his 
                                                                                                                 
 143. MARTIN A. KLEIN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 76 (2002); see also 
WITT, supra note 139, at 202 (describing Butler as “no abolitionist, at least not at the beginning of the 
war”). For Southerners, he was later dubbed “the Devil of New Orleans” for what are described as 
heavy-handed and corrupt tactics when he was in command of the Union occupation there. See 
generally CHESTER G. HEARN, WHEN THE DEVIL CAME DOWN TO DIXIE: BEN BUTLER IN NEW 
ORLEANS (1997). According to his autobiography, Butler fought for the Union not out of opposition to 
slavery; he defended the Southern states’ rights to pass their own laws regarding the institution. 
BENJAMIN BUTLER, BUTLER’S BOOK: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF MAJOR-
GENERAL BENJAMIN BUTLER 129–136 (2014). 
 144. BUTLER, supra note 143, at 131. 
 145. Id. at 128. 
 146. JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1861–1865, at 96 (2012). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 95. 
 150. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 343 (1995). 
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enemy’s own logic against it, arguing that slaves were property and 
used to aid in the enemy war effort. As such, he determined he 
should not return them. Indeed, when a Confederate officer, acting as 
an emissary of the Confederate Colonel, whom Butler knew from his 
days as a politician, appeared under flag of truce to claim ownership 
of the slaves, reclaim the slaves, and enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, 
Butler refused.151 According to Butler’s autobiography, he told the 
adversary the following: “‘I mean to take Virginia at her word, as 
declared in the ordinance of secession passed yesterday. I am under 
no constitutional obligations to a foreign country, which Virginia 
now claims to be.’”152 Butler’s position angered abolitionists like 
Frederick Douglass, who proclaimed that these escaped slaves were 
not to be considered contraband as if they were pistols;153 
nevertheless, Butler’s clever use of the Southern arguments to 
undermine their position seemed to offer a basis upon which Butler 
could conclude that he was under no obligation to return the escaped 
slaves. It would also solve a problem that President Lincoln faced: 
how to hold his coalitiona collection of factions that included those 
who wanted to abolish slavery and those who wanted to save the 
Uniontogether. The value of this decision for assuaging the 
different factions within Lincoln’s coalition was not lost on an 
editorial published in the Atlantic Monthly at the time. It stated: 
There is often great virtue in such technical phrases in 
shaping public opinion. They commend practical action to 
a class of minds little developed in the direction of the 
sentiments, which would be repelled by formulas of a 
broader and nobler import. The venerable gentleman, who 
wears gold spectacles and reads a conservative daily, 
prefers confiscation to emancipation. He is reluctant to 
have slaves declared freemen, but has no objection to their 
                                                                                                                 
 151. WITT, supra note 139, at 202–03. 
 152. BUTLER, supra note 143, at 257. 
 153. WITT, supra note 139, at 202–03. 
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being declared contrabands. His whole nature rises in 
insurrection when Beecher preaches in a sermon that a 
thing ought to be done because it is a duty, but he yields 
gracefully when Butler issues an order commanding it to be 
done because it is a military necessity.154 
Nevertheless, Butler’s position put another lawyer, Abraham 
Lincoln, in an uncomfortable spot, just as Frémont had been in 
months earlier. As said, Lincoln had a fragile coalition of unionists, 
who were supporting the war effort to preserve the republic, and 
abolitionists, who believed it was a crusade to end slavery.155 Lincoln 
needed some way to tie this coalition together, and he considered the 
question of whether to bring escaped slaves and free blacks into the 
war effort by arming them and forming black regiments to fight on 
the Union side.156 He knew he was depleting his stock of eligible 
fighting men in the North and saw the opportunity that presented 
itself of recruiting thousands of blacks to join the war effort.157 But 
he also knew that he would have to take steps toward freeing the 
slaves, at least escaped slaves and those liberated from southern 
territories, to offer these potential recruits and the abolitionists who 
supported freeing the slaves cause to support black enlistment.158 His 
policies toward slavery over the years had evolved.159 At times, he 
supported colonization for freed slaves, and at others, he supported 
compensation for slave owners who might be forced to give up their 
slaves.160 Lincoln ultimately settled on the notion that to keep his 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Edward L. Pierce, The Contrabands at Fort Monroe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1861, at 627. 
The individual referred to in the excerpt as “Beecher” is likely Presbyterian minister Lyman Beecher, 
father of Harriet Beecher Stowe, who authored the abolitionist publication Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Id. 
 155. DONALD, supra note 150, at 313. 
 156. Id. at 373–76. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Lincoln’s Evolving Thoughts on Slavery and Freedom, NPR (Oct. 11, 2010, 12:11 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2010/10/11/130489804/lincolns-evolving-thoughts-on-slavery-and-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/JN7G-T9K7]. 
 160. DONALD, supra note 150, at 343; Lincoln’s Evolving Thoughts on Slavery and Freedom, supra 
note 159. 
36
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss3/1
2019] CREATIVE LAWYERING 565 
coalition together, he would need to support the enlistment of black 
troops while giving them and their supporters a reason to enlist. 
Lincoln believed that this would satisfy the unionists who recognized 
the need to recruit black troops to support the war effort and the 
desire of the abolitionists to end slavery, at least in the South.161 This 
two-pronged approach culminated in the drafting of Emancipation 
Proclamation, which freed slaves in occupied territories and those 
who escaped to Union lines (a recognition, in a way, of the 
predicament in which Butler found himself and a nod to his on-the-
fly solution). But Lincoln still faced another hurdle before he could 
release the Proclamation. 
The Union war effort had stalled. General McClellan’s campaign 
to strike decisively at the heart of the Confederacy had ground to a 
frustrating halt on the Virginia peninsula.162 Grant had not yet 
emerged as the brilliant and dogged tactician that he later proved to 
be in subsequent years, and his campaign in the Mississippi was not 
going well.163 The major foreign powers of Great Britain and France 
watched developments in the war with great interest, poised to 
recognize the Confederacy, if not aid it outright, if it appeared that 
the South might be able to secure some kind of brokered peace and 
remain intact.164 Were Lincoln to release the Emancipation 
Proclamation at a point when the Union war effort was going poorly, 
he might seem weak, and its issuance a desperate, last-ditch effort to 
alter the course of the war. Lincoln needed a victory on the battlefield 
to give him an opening in which he could issue the Proclamation. He 
got one when Robert E. Lee tested the Union resolve in a march on 
Maryland, a slave state that, the Southern general felt, might have 
welcomed Confederate troops as heroes as opposed to invaders. This 
move would also likely have had the effect of drawing McClellan’s 
                                                                                                                 
 161. DONALD, supra note 150, at 373–76. 
 162. Id. at 369–70. 
 163. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 135, at 578 (describing failure of the first Vicksburg 
campaign). 
 164. Id. at 383 (describing Confederate efforts for diplomatic recognition from Great Britain and 
France). 
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troops away from their likely march on Richmond. But, “Little 
Napoleon,” as he was called, never exhibited any of the French 
emperor’s aggressiveness on the battlefield. McClellan’s forces 
clashed with Lee’s near the tiny town of Antietam in Maryland, 
which ultimately lent its name to the bloody melee that ensued 
there.165 Although historians often consider the battle a stalemate, 
Lee’s retreat from the field, after both sides suffered heavy losses, 
gave Lincoln the opportunity he needed to claim victory and issue the 
Emancipation Proclamation at one of the few high points of the war 
for the North, at least to that point.166 This edict helped unite 
Lincoln’s fragile coalition around the cause of ending slavery 
because it was the effort to end slavery, in Lincoln’s eyes, that would 
ultimately bring about the preservation of the Union. 
Lincoln’s chosen tactics in promoting abolition, at least in the 
Confederate states, was consistent with a prior statement on the 
interplay between abolition and maintaining the integrity of the 
nation. In a letter to abolitionist publisher Horace Greeley, Lincoln 
emphasized that his primary goal was to save the Union.167 To do so, 
he believed he needed to end slavery. Thus, his war aims and those of 
the abolitionists who sought to end slavery converged. Lincoln wrote: 
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, 
and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the 
Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could 
save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would 
also do that. 
What I do about slavery and the [colored] race, I do 
because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I 
                                                                                                                 
 165. DONALD, supra note 150, at 374. It is telling that the divisions between the North and South 
were so deep that the battle is often referred to not as the Battle of Antietam in the South but as the 
Battle of Sharpsburg. Battle of Antietam, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-
war/battle-of-antietam [https://perma.cc/4EXL-AA4M] (last updated Oct. 2, 2018). 
 166. DONALD, supra note 150, at 374. 
 167. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862) in 
SPEECHES AND LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 194–95 (Merwin Roe ed. photo. reprt. 1912) (1907). 
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forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to 
save the Union.168 
Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation was 
consistent with this approach. It satisfied the abolitionists for sure but 
also tied the unionists to the abolitionist cause by linking 
emancipation directly to the war effort. As one excerpt of the 
Proclamation reads: 
And I further declare and make known that such persons of 
suitable condition will be received into the armed service of 
the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and 
other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said 
service.169 
Lincoln, the tactician, proved to be adept and creative at using a 
legal strategy—here, the Emancipation Proclamation—and timing it 
in light of a major development in the war (the Battle of Antietam) to 
help achieve what appears to have been his ultimate social-change 
goal: preservation of the Union. 
Of course, the cause of civil rights would not end with the victory 
of Union forces or even passage of the Reconstruction Amendments 
to the Constitution. The next example to highlight is the effort to end 
Jim Crow segregation, which followed the collapse of the effort to 
reform the South in the wake of Reconstruction.170 
B.   Lawyers and the End of Jim Crow 
Unlike most discussions of this legal campaign, hatched in the 
offices of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. at 194–95. 
 169. The Emancipation Proclamation, Proclamation No. 95, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863); see also 
Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 851–57 
(2011) (describing the Emancipation Proclamation and its effects). 
 170. DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW 
WORLD 327 (2006) (tracing rise of Jim Crow to the demise of Reconstruction). 
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People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and those of other legal 
allies, I will not start with a discussion of the landmark case Brown v. 
Board of Education, in which the Supreme Court ruled unanimously 
that segregation in educational institutions violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.171 This was the beginning of the end of the institutional 
edifice of Jim Crow. The paradigm of social-change litigation, which 
took direct legal aim at segregation in broad-based challenges, had its 
predecessors in more modest, incremental, and narrowly crafted 
challenges. This eventually assisted other institutions in their efforts 
to build the legal case that could serve as a base to successfully 
launch the broader attack on segregation.172 
Heman Sweatt was a postman in Texas who wanted to go to law 
school in the late 1940s.173 The problem was that there were no law 
schools in the state of Texas that admitted African Americans.174 
Sweatt submited his application to the University of Texas School of 
Law, asserting that because the state university system did not have a 
separate law school for African Americans, the law school had to 
admit him.175 The state hastily put together what it tried to call a law 
school, but that entity had no full-time faculty (it “borrowed” faculty 
from the main law school), no law books, no alumni base, and no 
accreditation.176 The LDF challenged the university’s solution to the 
Sweatt application, arguing that, yes, segregation was 
unconstitutional.177 The lawyers also had a fallback position, 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). For a history of the Brown litigation, see 
generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263 (1975). 
 172. On early challenges to segregation in education and other contexts, see GARY M. LAVERGNE, 
BEFORE BROWN: HEMAN MARION SWEATT, THURGOOD MARSHALL, AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE 
73–85 (2010) (addressing early challenges to segregation in education and other contexts); MARK V. 
TUSHNET, THE NAACP: LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 70 
(1987). For a description of civil rights organizing before these campaigns, see SUSAN D. CARLE, 
DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–1915, at 6 (2013). 
 173. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 5. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632 (1950); LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 95. 
 176. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633. 
 177. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 97. 
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however. They argued that, taking the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson 
literally, if the university planned on offering separate institutions, 
the system had to make those institutions equal.178 
By any objective measure, the law school for African Americans 
was in no way equal to that offered to white students in the 
University of Texas system. The unaccredited school for African 
Americans with no faculty, essentially no students, and no books 
could not measure up to the University of Texas’s school of law, 
which had 850 students, a vast alumni network, 65,000 books in its 
library, and full accreditation.179 Even when the case went to trial and 
the law school for African Americans had twenty-three students, five 
full-time faculty, and 10,000 books, it still could not compare in 
quality or degree to the opportunities afforded to the students 
enrolled in the all-white institution.180 Even putting aside these 
objective measures, the LDF lawyers also argued that a law school is 
so much more than the books in its library or the physical 
accommodations. A law school is a platform for knowledge exchange 
and a network that creates mentorships and job opportunities for its 
students. It connects those students to the bench and the broader 
practicing bar. A good law school is more than just the sum of its 
parts and develops value to its students because of the relationship of 
those parts to each other and the broader community. A law school 
with fewer faculty, no alumni network, and weak ties to the broader 
community could not possibly afford its students with the same 
opportunities that the University of Texas’s law school for whites 
offered its students.181 
Although the lawyers knew all of these things about the qualities 
that make a great law school, they knew something else as well. They 
intuited that the judges would also know this about a law school.182 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at 100. 
 179. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 101–02 (noting Justice Robert Jackson’s incredulity in oral 
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The judges before whom such a case would come would all have 
gone to law school and know the ineffable qualities of a good law 
school, and they could compare the extent to which two law schools 
were comparable along these difficult to measure metrics. Although 
the LDF had tried to bring other somewhat successful lawsuits 
challenging segregation in other graduate and professional schools, it 
was the action filed against segregation in a separate and unequal law 
school where they gained the greatest legal traction.183 Although they 
would certainly include a direct challenge to segregation itself, and 
they enlisted the support of an anthropologist (who was also a 
lawyer) to make the claim that segregation was itself stigmatizing 
(foreshadowing the arguments they made in Brown), they also relied 
on a secondary position that even if one recognized that separate but 
equal was still the law of the land and Plessy was good law, if one 
took Plessy seriously, the separate and clearly unequal institution set 
up as the law school for African Americans in the University of 
Texas law school would not pass muster.184 Moreover, by 
challenging the way in which segregation operated in an institution 
that judges would understand well, the LDF lawyers made a brilliant 
tactical decision to appeal to the judge’s own appreciation for the 
special qualities upon which one can compare separate institutions, 
more so, perhaps, than they might understand other institutions that 
the LDF might target.185 Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously 
concluded in Sweatt v. Painter not that segregation was 
unconstitutional on its face, but, rather, that the operation of a 
                                                                                                                 
MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 60, 64 (1998), and JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE 
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 69–78 
(1994). 
 183. For a review of these earlier setbacks, see TUSHNET, supra note 172, at 70–104. On the strategy 
of targeting segregation in graduate schools, see ROBERT J. COTTROL, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: 
CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 58–76 (2003). The NAACP had begun to gain traction with 
these cases involving graduate schools, however, and, on the same day the Court decided Sweatt, it ruled 
that onerous conditions imposed on a student seeking a graduate degree in a school of education were 
also unconstitutional. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 
(1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.S. 337, 349 (1938). 
 184. LAVERGNE, supra note 172, at 103–05 (describing trial strategy in Sweatt). 
 185. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
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separateand clearly unequallaw school for African Americans 
could not pass constitutional muster.186 
One of the reasons—apart from the objective criteria—that the 
Court reached this conclusion was that it was “more important” that 
the law school for whites “possesses to a far greater degree those 
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which 
make for greatness in a law school.”187 These qualities included but 
were not limited to the following: the “reputation of the faculty, 
experience of the administration, position and influence of the 
alumni, standing in the community, traditions[,] and prestige.”188 
Although the Court could easily differentiate the two schools along 
objective criteria, the Court concluded that “[i]t is difficult to believe 
that one who had a free choice between these law schools would 
consider the question close.”189 Moreover, “Few students and no one 
who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic 
vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of 
views with which the law is concerned.”190 The school for African 
Americans “excludes from its student body members of the racial 
groups which number 85% of the population of the [s]tate and 
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges[,] and other 
officials with whom [the] petitioner will inevitably be dealing when 
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.”191 For these reasons, the 
Court could not conclude “that the education offered [to the] 
petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if 
admitted to the University of Texas Law School.”192 
In many ways, this incremental challenge to segregation ultimately 
set the stage for the lawyers’ work that followed in bringing the 
broader challenges to segregation in primary and secondary 
educational institutions in several jurisdictions across the country that 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. at 635. 
 187. Id. at 634. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
 192. Id. 
43
Brescia: Creative Lawyering for Social Change
Published by Reading Room, 2019
572 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
would culminate in the victory in Brown. In those challenges, the 
LDF lawyers brought in experts from other disciplines, like 
sociology, to establish that segregation had a stigmatizing effect.193 
They built on the arguments made in Sweatt that separate was 
inherently unequal, and, once again, the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously in their favor, this time concluding that separate but 
equal would no longer stand.194 
C.   Lawyers and Marriage Equality 
The final example to examine is the work of the lawyers who 
helped lead the successful campaign for recognition of marriage 
equality for the LGBTQ community. That campaign, which was 
really many campaignsthe first of which began in the early 1990s 
in Hawaiiproceeded in fits and starts.195 There were victories in the 
courts in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts on state constitutional 
grounds, but at least some of those victories were undermined by 
legislative action or the work of advocacy groups that organized 
ballot initiatives to overrule those courts by adopting constitutional 
amendments that barred recognition of same-sex marriage.196 In 
addition, fear that states where same-sex marriage was not legal 
would be expected to recognize same-sex marriages from states 
where they were legal prompted Congress to take legislative action 
and pass the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The DOMA allowed 
states the option to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage with 
respect to a range of federal benefits that accrued to married 
heterosexuals.197 Moreover, the forces aligned against marriage 
equality gained enough momentum that they sought to introduce 
anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiatives in many states, mostly timed 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See MOTLEY, supra note 182, at 61–73 (describing use of experts in Brown trials); e.g., KLUGER, 
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to generate conservative voter turnout for the 2004 presidential 
election.198 Most of these ballot initiatives succeeded.199 When 
conservative groups sought to promote a ballot initiative in 
California, a deeply liberal state, many thought they had gone too far 
and that the state’s voters would reject it.200 
On election night 2008, when the nation was electing its first 
African-American president, and voters in California voted 
overwhelmingly in his favor, Californian voters passed so-called 
Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in the state.201 This 
came as a shock to advocates for same-sex marriage across the 
nation, leading them to take stock of their efforts and consider what, 
if anything, they might do differently in the future to promote same-
sex marriage and rebound from this devastating defeat.202 
Advocates in the LGBTQ community and their allies conducted a 
review of their efforts in an attempt to defeat Proposition 8.203 They 
worked with researchers to conduct focus groups and surveys of 
voters to assess what they had done wrong and how they might 
change their strategies and tactics.204 This review produced startling 
results.205 They learned that the way they had been going about 
promoting same-sex marriage was all wrong. They had made 
legalistic arguments, like same-sex couples were denied hospital 
visiting privileges and other benefits granted to heterosexual 
couples.206 These types of arguments, they learned, left many 
potential allies cold and led them to believe that the marriage-
equality advocates were seeking something different than what 
heterosexual couples achieved through marriage.207 Voters told 
advocates that they thought the advocates were looking for special 
                                                                                                                 
 198. FRANK, supra note 49, at 164. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 177. 
 201. Id. at 186–87. 
 202. See Ball, supra note 49. 
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treatment for same-sex couples. For the advocates, nothing was 
further from the truth. Indeed, what the advocates wanted was simply 
equal treatment: i.e., marriage equality.208 They took this feedback to 
heart and began to shift their message in subtle yet powerful ways. 
They began to advocate for marriage equality, not same-sex 
marriage.209 They stressed that what the LGQBTQ community 
wanted was equal recognition of their relationships and equal access 
to the institution of marriage on the same terms as heterosexual 
couples.210 This subtle shift began to turn the tide.211 
In addition to the shift in messaging, as with the desegregation 
litigation, legal advocates challenging Proposition 8 in the courts 
deployed sociology and psychology expert witnesses to undermine 
the key arguments of the ballot initiative’s supporters.212 
In 2012, just four years after the devastating loss in California, 
advocates won ballot initiatives in Maine, Minnesota, Maryland and 
Washington State.213 Two years later, they won a challenge to certain 
core aspects of DOMA in United States v. Windsor.214 Finally, in 
2015, they won the landmark Obergefell v. Hodges case,215 which 
established that states could not deny members of the LGBTQ 
community access to marriage. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, sided with those who favored the marriage equality 
                                                                                                                 
 208. FRANK, supra note 49, at 96, 162–63. 
 209. See id. at 167. 
 210. See id. at 7–8. 
 211. See id. at 188. 
 212. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, Letitia Anne Peplau, Distinguished Research Professor of Psychology Emerita at 
UCLA, testified that most individuals who marry benefit socially, physically, and psychologically as a 
result of being married. Transcript of Proceedings at 574, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 
(No. C 09-2292-VRW). She further testified that same-sex relationships are similar in quality and nature 
to heterosexual relationships and if allowed to marry, same-sex couples would derive the same benefits 
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provided testimony regarding parenting, explaining that research has shown that effective parenting 
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Proposition 8 litigation). 
 213. FRANK, supra note 49, at 285, 287. 
 214. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013). 
 215. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
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arguments as opposed to the “special treatment” arguments that 
preceded the loss in the Proposition 8 fight. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
[B]y virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-
sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the 
[s]tates have linked to marriage. This harm results in more 
than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned 
to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem 
intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself 
makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it 
attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of 
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important 
respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock 
them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. 
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent 
purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest 
meaning.216 
The triumph of the marriage-equality campaign follows a tradition 
of creative lawyering for social change that dates back to the Civil 
War era and even to the framing of the United States Constitution. I 
have used three examples of lawyers who contributed to successful 
efforts to bring about social change. Are there common lessons that 
one can draw from these experiences? The next Part addresses this 
question. 
III.   A Taxonomy of Creative Social-Change Lawyering 
This review of the role of lawyers in the campaigns to end slavery 
in the United States, defeat Jim Crow, and advance the cause of 
marriage equality for the LGBTQ community reveals some common 
themes of that work and the ways in which lawyers working for 
social change can adopt creative strategies for promoting that change. 
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As the following discussion shows, some of these themes include that 
the work is often incremental and iterative; it involves what is 
sometimes referred to as “reframing”—looking at issues in new, and 
different ways, especially the arguments of one’s opponents; it often 
borrows from other disciplines; it seeks out opportunities for interest 
convergence among otherwise disparate groups; and it does not 
operate in a vacuum in that it is often conscious of corresponding 
events in society that might have a bearing on the ways in which 
legal strategies will be perceived and whether or not they will be 
supported at a particular point in time. This Part discusses each of 
these characteristics, in turn. 
A.   Incremental, Iterative Advocacy 
Probably the main common feature of these three examples of 
creative lawyering is that each involved incremental and iterative 
steps. For the end of slavery, although the factions within Lincoln’s 
fragile coalition may have disagreed about what the North’s goals 
should be, the smaller steps taken to address the issue of escaped 
slaves finding themselves among Union troops helped lay the 
groundwork for what ultimately became the Emancipation 
Proclamation and, at the conclusion of the war, ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment during Reconstruction. Lincoln did not 
announce an end to slavery at the outset of the war. If he had done so, 
he might have faced the prospect of the border states that had both 
remained slave holding but also stayed in the Union deciding to 
secede or at least not supporting the war effort. Similarly, 
conservatives in the North might have aligned themselves behind the 
war effort for the purpose of preserving the Union but might not have 
embraced such an effort if they perceived it as primarily a campaign 
to end slavery. The incremental steps taken by Union generals like 
Frémont and, more effectively, the attorney and fortress commander, 
General Butler, helped lay the groundwork for the Emancipation 
Proclamation, through which Lincoln was able to satisfy different 
portions of his fragile coalition. This incremental, iterative strategy 
shows that doing nothing about slavery was unacceptable to the 
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abolitionists, but Frémont’s strategy went too far for some. In the 
end, Butler’s approach seemed to be just right, a balancing of 
interests that tied abolition to the war effort. It is possible that this 
type of approach, accomplished through experimentation and 
iteration, may have helped show Lincoln the way forward by 
revealing a strategy that could bind the different fractious portions of 
his ruling coalition. 
Similarly, the LDF’s iterative, incremental approach also helped to 
lay the groundwork for the campaign that ultimately succeeded in 
bringing about the victory in Brown v. Board of Education and the 
end to Jim Crow in education. These successes helped light a fire 
among the activists that helped them bring about changes in public 
accommodations, housing, and voting through legislative victories, 
the organizing for which had been prompted by the end of separate 
but equal. The LDF lawyers in Sweatt and other similar cases, took 
on smaller, individual institutions rather than those they eventually 
assailed in the collection of cases that led to Brown, which attacked 
the broader edifice of Jim Crow. Although these lawyers certainly 
challenged Jim Crow directly, cases like Sweatt afforded the judges 
an opportunity to slowly chip away at the broader system. By filing 
this sort of smaller, probing attack against an institution like a law 
school, an institution the judges would understand, they made it 
possible to show that a school system would have a hard time 
offering separate and equal institutions. 
Incrementalism also helps advocates develop different types of 
arguments, field test them, explore how well they are received by a 
wider audience, and bring back the feedback from those efforts to 
further hone those arguments in broader contexts. In many ways, this 
iterative, incremental approach is akin to the concept known as 
“design thinking,”217 which is sometimes seen as having four main 
components: inspiration, synthesis, ideation and experimentation, and 
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implementation.218 The inspiration phase is investigatory. It involves 
communicating with those who are most affected by a problem or 
issue to work with them to explore potential solutions.219 Once the 
inspiration phase is complete (although, in some ways, it is never 
really complete), the design thinker moves into the ideation and 
experimentation phase, where prototypes are developed and field 
tested to assess their effectiveness in terms of addressing the problem 
at hand.220 The results of this rapid prototyping help to create a 
feedback loop, and the original efforts and tactics are then altered in 
response to the data received through the successes and failures of 
those prototypes to create new prototypes and run new 
experiments.221 After successful prototyping, a finished product or 
idea can go mainstream, although the experimentation, iteration, 
feedback, and modification are ongoing processes.222 This 
design-thinking approach is similar to how Linda Morton describes 
legal creative problem solving.223 That process, for her, includes 
identification of the problem, understanding it, posing solutions, 
choosing solutions, implementing solutions, and engaging in a final 
analysis of the chosen solutions.224 Similarly, the ABA’s 1992 report 
identifies several technical steps related to problem solving, 
including identification of the problem, the generation of solutions to 
the problem, developing and implementing a plan of action, and 
remaining open to new information and ideas.225 
A design-thinking approach to creative problem solving would 
seem perfectly suited for social-change advocacy in the legal 
context.226 Lawyers can gather the perspectives of their clients to 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See id. at 22–24; see also TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN 16 (2009) (describing design 
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understand the problems they are trying to solve and begin to develop 
solutions to these problems. Additionally, they can prototype 
potential solutions based on that fact-finding process, can launch 
prototypes of the solutions into the world to see how they fare, bring 
feedback from those efforts to craft more robust solutions, and then 
take more dramatic steps based on those iterated prototypes and the 
lessons learned from the prototyping process and the feedback loop it 
generates.227 
B.   Interpretive Creativity 
We also see in these examples that the creative lawyers seeking 
social change engaged in a degree of interpretative creativity, often 
reframing the legal issues in new ways or borrowing from their 
opponents’ arguments and using those arguments against them. 
Menkel-Meadow calls this notion of reframing finding new “entry 
points”—a new way of looking at a problem from different 
perspectives.228 Of course, many lawyers spend much of their time 
interpreting statutes, regulations, contracts, and behavior in light of 
all three, but social-change lawyers are often in a more difficult 
position than traditional lawyers because their paths to interpretative 
success are narrower. They are trying to change the status quo and 
alter the legal infrastructure that governs behavior within that status 
quo. Common interpretations of the scope and contours of that 
infrastructure gain some interpretive force because of the widely 
                                                                                                                 
(Nov. 15, 2011), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/why_social_innovators_need_design_thinking 
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shared and widely accepted understandings of their meaning. Of 
course, this forces the social-change lawyer to be more creative in her 
interpretive efforts and can leave her with little choice but to attempt 
to seize upon her opponents’ arguments, embrace them, and bend 
them to support the social-change lawyer’s position.229 
This is often apparent in many efforts by lawyers to advance social 
change. They may have little support for their own positions, so they 
turn to the positions of their opponents to show the hypocrisy of them 
or the fact that they are based on weak legal force themselves.230 This 
is often an important asset for the social-change advocate fighting 
long odds. Malcolm Gladwell, in his work David and Goliath: 
Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants, points out that our 
perception of power asymmetries are often wrong.231 The very 
qualities that may appear to give strength to a dominant individual or 
entity are often a source of great weakness.232 The Biblical Goliath 
was weighted down by his bulk and heavy armor.233 Turkish 
fortifications were easily overrun by Lawrence of Arabia’s nimble 
Bedouin cavalry.234 For the social-change lawyer, when the 
arguments of her adversary, that might have enjoyed support from 
what might have been seen as common-sense arguments, are held up 
to rigorous analysis, they often collapse under their own weight. 
In the decades leading up to the decision in Obergefell, advocates 
for the rights of the LGBTQ community won victories in the 
Supreme Court showing that a state constitutional amendment in 
Colorado stripping local communities of the ability to pass pro-
                                                                                                                 
 229. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and the 
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LGQBTQ rights ordinances, and laws against sodomy, were based on 
little more than the moral preferences of legislators that could not 
withstand careful scrutiny.235 Similarly, in the state courts of New 
York, a legal definition of family that appeared based on little more 
than traditional notions, with no basis in law, failed to recognize the 
many ways in which families form and their members recognize 
themselves as such.236 The arguments supporting the opponents’ 
position might have been, at one time, consistent with the common 
sensibilities of some portion of the population and might have, at one 
time, seemed inevitable and subject to little criticism. When analyzed 
for their sources and their logic, however, these arguments proved 
insufficient to support discriminatory treatment through the force of 
law. 
At the same time, if the force of the common-sense support for the 
opponent’s position is too strong to overcome a direct attack, the 
social-change lawyer often uses her opponents’ own arguments 
against them. We saw this in Butler’s controversial cooption of 
Southern arguments about property and secession to justify his 
refusal to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. Similarly, although the 
LDF challenged segregation directly in Sweatt, they also tried 
another line of argument: that even accepting separate but equal as 
the law of the land, the separate law school for African Americans 
was not, in fact, equal by any measure.237 Thus, forcing their 
opponents to defend their own position, these positions became 
untenable on the facts. 
Artist Pablo Picasso is sometimes quoted as having said that “good 
artists copy, great artists steal.”238 Perhaps the best, most creative 
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social-change lawyers also steal—they just steal from their 
opponents. 
C.   Interdisciplinary Approaches 
Another common feature of the social-change efforts highlighted 
here is that the lawyers in at least two of the three examples, the LDF 
lawyers and the marriage-equality advocates, explicitly incorporated 
interdisciplinary approaches in their advocacy.239 Thurgood Marshall 
brought together sociologists, historians, political scientists, 
educators, and anthropologists while planning the anti-segregation 
strategy.240 The Sweatt trial, like those that would lead to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, included expert testimony from 
another discipline. In fact, anthropologist Robert Redfield, chairman 
of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, 
embodied interdisciplinarity: he held a doctorate in anthropology, as 
well as a law degree.241 Redfield testified about the lack of 
differences in the educational capacity of African Americans as 
compared to whites, as well as the dangers of segregation in 
education, particularly as the dangers related to the price that society 
pays for the distrust that segregation creates among the population.242 
In Brown, Thurgood Marshall and the legal team used the research 
and testimony of psychiatrist Frederic Wertham and sociologist 
Kenneth B. Clark to show the harmful effects of segregation on 
African-American children.243 
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In the marriage equality litigation, lawyer’s utilized expert 
witnesses in the trial courts to show the complete lack of evidence in 
support of the opponents’ positions—that marriage could not be open 
to same-sex couples because children did not fare well when reared 
in families headed by parents of the same sex.244 In addition, in the 
wake of the failure to defeat Proposition 8, advocates enlisted the 
support of researchers in surveying and conducting focus groups to 
understand the failure of the campaign’s messaging strategies.245 
In many ways, the social-change lawyer’s use of interdisciplinary 
strategies builds on the iterative and interpretative approaches 
described above in that it helps to reframe arguments and tests other 
theories against perceived wisdom and common understandings of 
the law and society that may need to change to bring about wider 
social change. These interdisciplinary approaches are not new, as 
Louis Brandeis, then a practicing lawyer in the early 20th century, 
used social science to support his legal claims.246 By incorporating 
disciplines other than law, social-change advocates widen their own 
lenses when they view a problem and begin to see legal issues in a 
different light, which then helps them frame their arguments and 
present new theories and new ways of looking at the world to judges, 
juries, policymakers, legislators, and the general public. In turn, these 
theories, informed by interdisciplinary views, might find an audience 
more receptive to these arguments because they help that audience 
see the law in different ways, undermining traditional understandings 
and interpretations of the law and social relations. Those new 
understandings and interpretations can lead to the social change that 
lawyers and those whom she serves may seek to bring about. 
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D.   Interest Convergence 
President Lincoln and the lawyers for the Civil Rights Movement 
knew not only that they could build a coalition to achieve their 
social-change goals but that they had to do so, and they both crafted 
these coalitions around the interests that different members and 
groups shared.247 This convergence of interests helped build and 
sustain critical coalitions necessary to support and advance the 
social-change movement that the leaders and their lawyers wanted to 
bring about. Derrick Bell first identified the notion that interest 
convergence could justify changes to our collective understanding of 
constitutional law.248 Bell first articulated his Interest-Convergence 
Theory in response to Herbert Wechsler’s argument critiquing the 
Court’s decision in Brown.249 Weschler argued that Brown was not 
supportable by what he called “neutral principles”: when a court 
“reach[es] judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the 
immediate result that is achieved.”250 Wechsler argued that 
promoting the freedom of association of blacks could not undermine 
the freedom of association of whites.251 
Countering Weschler, Bell asserted that the shared interests 
between the black community and a large proportion of the white 
community justified the decision in Brown.252 For Bell, the interests 
of blacks (and others) in seeking an end to segregation aligned with 
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national white elites who were concerned with the United States’s 
standing in the world, particularly as it sought to maintain its 
influence in post-colonial nations where the Soviet Union was using 
the Jim Crow system as a wedge between the United States and 
potential allies.253 Mary Dudziak’s archival research lends ample 
support for Bell’s explanation of the forces that aligned to bring 
about the unanimous decision in Brown.254 
Bell used the Interest-Convergence Theory to explain and justify 
the Court’s decision in Brown.255 Some have taken this theory a step 
further, as a way to not just understand but also to promote social 
change generally; when one wants to advance social change, one 
should look for an alignment of interests among different factions 
and communities and seek out ways to build coalitions around the 
aligned interests.256 However, the theory itself is not above critique, 
and some argue that it is flawed in that it appears to discount the 
agency of advocates in spurring social change, suggesting that one 
needs to wait for interests to converge to bring about social 
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change.257 But lawyers who support efforts to bring about social 
change can turn to the Interest-Convergence Theory as an organizing 
principle and guide to work with clients and partners to be the agents 
of that change. 
Although Bell identified the convergence of interests that were at 
the center of the Civil Rights Movement’s advocacy, this idea 
appears in the two other examples described above.258 First, Lincoln 
tied ending slavery to preserving the union. To hold his coalition 
together, Lincoln knew that he needed to address the slavery question 
and seek to bring about its end. However, Lincoln could only go so 
far with his Emancipation Proclamation, however, and slavery was 
not abolished in the border states that both maintained slaveholding 
yet remained loyal to the Union. For those who saw victory on the 
battlefield as essential to preserving the Union, freeing the slaves in 
Confederate states and territories occupied by Union forces increased 
the number of eligible males available to serve as troops in the Union 
army. The North’s martial strategy, particularly in the latter years of 
the conflict, was to field much larger armies, attack Southern forces 
at as many points as possible to test their capacity, and strike at 
critical transportation and supply hubs.259 Each aspect of this strategy 
needed as many troops as possible, and Lincoln knew that he could 
increase recruitment by making former slaves available to join the 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Driver, supra note 256, at 175. Justin Driver argues that Interest-Convergence Theory has its 
flaws because it discounts the role of the agency of the actors who seek to promote social change: 
The interest-convergence thesis accords an almost complete absence of agency to two 
groups of actors who exercise a great deal of control regarding the advancement of black 
interests: the black citizenry and the white judiciary. By implicitly encouraging black 
citizens to await the magical moment when their interests converge with the white 
majority, the interest-convergence thesis sharply discounts the capacity of black people to 
participate in their own uplift. Conversely, by reducing white judges to mere 
functionaries who do the bidding of the white establishment, the interest-convergence 
thesis simultaneously diminishes the culpability of white judges who exercise their 
authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy and denies the credit owed to white 
members of the judiciary who challenge that hierarchy. 
Id. (footnote omitted). For a response to Driver, see Kevin Terry, Community Dreams and Nightmares: 
Arizona, Ethnic Studies, and the Continued Relevance of Derrick Bell’s Interest-Convergence Thesis, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1483, 1494–95 (2013). 
 258. See supra Part II. 
 259. MCPHERSON, supra note 135, at 721–22. 
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army to carry out these strategic goals. The Emancipation 
Proclamation ultimately satisfied his coalition’s goals by tying the 
abolition of slavery to preserving the Union. 
For the marriage-equality advocates within the LGBTQ 
movement, there was not always support for the effort to promote 
same-sex marriage rights. As Nathaniel Frank recounts in his work 
Awakening: How Gays and Lesbians Brought Marriage Equality to 
America,260 members of the more radical elements of the LGBTQ 
movement did not support the effort to recognize same-sex marriage 
initially, but different strains of the movement would ultimately 
coalesced around the idea of marriage equality as a way to 
accomplish broader protections for the community, gain respect, 
counter discrimination, and attain cultural acceptance of LGBTQ 
members and relationships. 261 This sort of interest convergence also 
occurred outside the movement itself. After President Obama 
signaled his support for marriage equality, the NAACP announced its 
own support for the effort, which represented a shift for the African-
American community after the results of the Proposition 8 vote in 
California showed communities of color narrowly supporting the 
ban.262 The NAACP identified a robust interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause that was consistent with what marriage-equality 
advocates sought given their own interests and views on the 
applicable constitutional protections.263 
In each of these situations, Bell’s Interest-Convergence approach 
seems to represent an aspect of the lawyers’ strategies: keep fragile 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See FRANK, supra note 49. 
 261. See id. at 59–76 (describing evolution of LGBTQ rights activism around AIDS, reform of anti-
sodomy laws, and adoption that brought different strands of that advocacy together in the form of 
support for marriage equality). 
 262. Peter Wallsten & Scott Wilson, Obama Endorses Gay Marriage, Says Same-Sex Couples Should 
Have Right to Wed, WASH. POST (May 9, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/05/09/gIQAivsWDU_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_te
rm=.1be0969bcbf6 [https://perma.cc/J8EG-PSHA]. 
 263. Peter Wallsten, NAACP Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (May 19, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/election-2012/post/naacp-endorses-same-sex-
marriage/2012/05/19/gIQA5SFSbU_blog.html?utm_term=.14d28dca5985 [https://perma.cc/X9PY-
B3SP]. 
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coalitions together and bring new groups into the coalition through 
the thoughtful curation of shared interests. 
E.   Interdependence 
Similarly, the legal advocates in each of these situations did not 
advocate in a vacuum and were always conscious of events and 
trends in culture and society generally. Lincoln waited for a victory 
on the battlefield before he released the Emancipation Proclamation. 
A deeply religious man, Lincoln is sometimes described as waiting 
for a victory because he sought a spiritual sign that his cause was 
just.264 He and his cabinet advisors were also keenly aware that 
releasing the Proclamation when the North was losing the war would 
be seen as an act of desperation.265 Lincoln’s willingness to create a 
new legal approach toward slaves that had escaped from lands 
controlled by Confederate forces was in some ways beholden to the 
larger forces at play as he considered the Proclamation’s release. 
Moreover, Lincoln struck a delicate balance in the manner and timing 
of the issuance of the proclamation, particularly as it related to both 
enhancing the northern forces’ capacity to recruit more able-bodied 
soldiers as well as preserving the slaveholding status of loyal border 
states. 
With the lawyers supporting the Civil Rights Movement, they 
were keenly aware of the predicament in which national leaders 
found themselves on the geopolitical stage. Lawyers exploited the 
fact that the standing of the United States with developing nations 
while the country was engaged in competition with Soviet Bloc 
countries for global influence.266 Throughout the course of the Civil 
Rights Movement’s struggle in the courts, and while the movement 
went from the courts to the streets and the halls of Congress in the 
1960s, the national security and foreign policy components of the 
                                                                                                                 
 264. WITT, supra note 139, at 214–15. 
 265. Id. at 214. 
 266. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8), 1952 WL 82045 (arguing that Jim Crow frustrated and undermined foreign 
diplomacy). 
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civil rights strategy played a role in the movement’s advocacy to 
bring about legislative changes to private accommodations, housing, 
and voting rights.267 This aspect of the strategy was not lost on 
national leaders. In a conversation with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
President Lyndon B. Johnson praised his legislative efforts in 
promoting civil rights, referencing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
follows: “I think the greatest achievement in foreign policy [of the 
Johnson administration] . . . was the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.”268 
Progressive advocates have also shifted their focus away from the 
federal courts in many instances as a reaction to the ways in which 
the federal judiciary has become more conservative because the 
Reagan Administration began to use the judicial appointment power 
to select more overtly partisan judges.269 This practice continued 
through the presidency of George W. Bush and has proceeded apace 
during the Trump Administration.270 As a part of this campaign, at 
least originally, officials in the Reagan Administration sought to 
curtail the type of social-change litigation, like Brown, that became 
known as public law litigation.271 This effort was designed to protect 
not only federal actors from judicial oversight but also state- and 
local-government allies of the Administration from judicial 
intervention in their practices.272 In what Derrick Bell might have 
called an “interest convergence,” probusiness forces also advocated 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Conversation with MARTIN LUTHER KING and OFFICE SECRETARY, January 15, 1965, 
MILLER CTR. PUB. AFFS., http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/lbj-wh6501.04-6736 
[https://perma.cc/6BAL-LH7C]. 
 268.  Id. 
 269. Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., NY TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives. 
html [https://perma.cc/TC5Y-4MRS]. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 
(1976). 
 272. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1543, 1552 (2014) (describing how the first issue the Reagan Administration attempted to 
address in terms of litigation reform was limiting access to courts to pursue federal rights, not torts that 
business interests might seek to limit). 
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for relief from litigation.273 First, members of the judiciary, for 
political reasons or out of a desire to control their own dockets, 
sought mechanisms for reining in many different types of litigation, 
including public law and social-change litigation.274 Indeed, in 
decisions such as Bell Atlantic v. Twombly275 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,276 
the Supreme Court altered the rules of pleading to require litigants to 
set forth their claims and defenses with such specificity that they 
might render their claims plausible in the eyes of the judge.277 
Second, courts have made the dispositive remedy of summary 
judgment more readily available by interpreting Rule 56 and other 
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more favorably for 
moving parties so that they might avoid a trial on the merits.278 Third, 
courts have interpreted fee-shifting statutes more narrowly than in the 
past, making contingency-fee cases less attractive to the private 
bar.279 Fourth, courts have taken a more expansive view of 
                                                                                                                 
 273. Bell, Jr., supra note 248, at 523. In recent years, according to a compelling empirical study, 
litigants looking for a judiciary more favorable to business interests found it, at least in the Supreme 
Court. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471–
72 (2013) (finding more pro-business Justices in the Roberts Court than in previous eras). 
 274. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1839, 1859–67 (2014) (describing growth of civil caseloads and judicial response thereto); 
see also Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114 (2006) (describing 
“‘hostility’ to ‘litigation’” as a driving force behind procedural jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court). 
Siegel’s analysis of the decisions of the Rehnquist Court led him to conclude as follows: “The common 
thread throughout is doubt in the efficacy of a lawsuit as a mechanism for resolving the problem at hand, 
coupled perhaps with a disproportionate animosity towards those who believe otherwise.” Id. at 1115; 
see also Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 823–40 (2011) (raising 
prospect that expanded access to the courts can provoke a judicial backlash out of concerns over 
increased court dockets). 
 275. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 276. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
 277. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 17–23 (2010) (describing the Twombly and Iqbal decisions 
and their impact on pleading requirements in civil cases in the federal courts). 
 278. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 982, 1016–21 (2003) (noting “shifting judicial attitude” in favor of more readily granting summary 
judgment). 
 279. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 610 (2001); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: 
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1087, 1133 
(2007) (describing Buckhannon as part of an “ominous shift of power away from private enforcement of 
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government immunity for both state and local officials.280 In 
addition, courts have raised the standard for certifying expert 
witnesses,281 made class actions more difficult to commence and 
sustain,282 recognized the enforceability of arbitration clauses,283 and 
refused to engage in oversight of institutions that are the subject of 
reform litigation.284 Owen Fiss has described these and other trends 
away from public law litigation as a “counterrevolution” in the 
courts.285 As a result, in many instances progressive lawyers have had 
to explore tactics for promoting progressive social-change objectives 
other than through the filing of high-profile impact litigation in the 
federal courts. 
In many ways, the fact that the federal courts have become more 
hostile to public-law litigation in general and, by extension, social-
change litigation in particular has led to the type of pluralistic 
approaches that many social-change lawyers are adopting. These 
lawyers seek out new avenues for redress and advocacy apart from 
looking solely to the federal courts as the venue for and the target of 
advocacy.286 Although litigation is a common tactic used by 
progressive lawyers, many have turned to state courts as the forum in 
                                                                                                                 
rights toward government power both to resist civil rights mandates and to control the enforcement of 
these rights”). 
 280. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 322–26 (2012) 
(describing the trend toward recognizing government immunity in different settings). 
 281. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (setting standard for 
recognition of expert witness); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial 
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 517, 554–56 (2010) (describing the impact of Daubert on civil rights litigation). 
 282. For a description of these trends, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T 
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Future of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1466–
68 (2013) (describing judicial endorsement of institutional defendants’ efforts to terminate consent 
decrees in public law litigation); Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 187 (2017) (noting that institutional reform litigation “has lost much 
of the prominence and momentum it had during its initial phases”). 
 285. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1979); see also Siegel, supra note 274, at 1114 (describing the Rehnquist Court’s “litigation 
hostility” as a “powerful force shaping the Court’s basal understanding of its institutional project”). 
 286. See supra Part I.C. 
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which to litigate claims based on state constitutions and state law.287 
But litigation alone is not the only tactic used by lawyers working for 
social change. The lawyers also engaged in legislative advocacy,288 
policy change,289 community development efforts through the 
provision of transactional legal services,290 and supporting grassroots 
organizing.291 
Because the Brown litigation preceded this conservative backlash 
in the courts, and some would argue it was the reason for backlash,292 
we must turn to the tactics of the marriage equality movement to 
assess whether or not turning away from federal courts is a part of 
that pluralistic, tactical approach embedded in a realpolitik that 
recognizes these wider trends in society in general and their 
ramifications on the federal judiciary. As we saw with Lincoln in the 
Battle of Antietam and civil rights advocates’ recognition of the role 
that foreign policy interests could play in applying pressure on the 
federal government to support their cause, marriage-equality 
advocates waited until the point where the wider aims could be 
served by litigating in federal court despite the obstacles described 
above. These advocates chose to litigate in state courts under state 
constitutional provisions until the opportunity presented itself to 
bring the broader challenge to prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
under the United States Constitution. At the same time, the landmark 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37 (2012), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/AZP5-
FUF2] (describing role of state actors and embrace of state fora for the pursuit of progressive policy 
goals). 
 288. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 991 (describing value and role of legislative advocacy in social-change lawyering). 
 289. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Legal Services Support Centers and Rebellious Advocacy: A Case Study 
of the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 267–68 (2008) (describing, 
among other things, policy work of social-change organization). 
 290. See Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED Empowerment 
Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory Decision-Making and 
Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 255–56 (2010) (offering case study of 
transactional, progressive lawyering). 
 291. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 443, 460 (2001) (providing overview of progressive lawyering and community organizing). 
 292. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at xviii–xix. 
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cases of the LGBTQ rights advocacyLawrence v. Texas,293 United 
States v. Windsor,294 and Obergefell v. Hodges295were all filed in 
federal court and made their way to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. For each of these cases, a federal constitutional issue was at 
the heart of the litigation, and even if the case had begun in state 
court, the Supreme Court would have been the ultimate arbiter of the 
claims. The litigants might have had a choice of where they might 
file the case, but there was no doubt about where the cases would 
ultimately end up. At the same time, with the painstaking, 
incremental work of marriage-equality advocacy, that work, seeking 
out strategic victories where they could find them to create a critical 
mass of victories at the state level, was, for the most part, carried out 
in state courts. From Hawaii to Massachusetts and Vermont, the 
marriage-equality advocates, fearing resistance at the Supreme Court 
and the fact that the federal judiciary might not be ready to rule in 
their favor, filed lawsuits based mostly on state constitutional 
grounds.296 Thus, these advocates were not insensitive to the trends in 
the courts and wider society and crafted strategies that were mindful 
of those trends when they decided the legal steps to advance the 
cause of marriage equality.297 
The legal advocacy directed at social change described here seems 
to indicate that these highlighted efforts shared several common 
themes. These efforts were often incremental in nature. They 
required creativity in terms of the ways in which the advocates 
viewed the law. They often involved interdisciplinary approaches. 
The advocates sought out opportunities to build coalitions through 
finding common ground—referred to here as interest convergence—
with likely and unlikely partners. And they viewed their work in the 
context of what was happening in the world outside of their 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 294. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 295. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015). 
 296. John F. Kowal, The Improbable Victory of Marriage Equality, Brennan Center for Justice (Sept. 
29, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/improbable-victory-marriage-equality 
[https://perma.cc/4K37-FA7Z]. 
 297. See FRANK, supra note 49, at 70 (describing LQBTQ rights advocacy in state courts). 
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advocacy, assessing their work in light of the broader social context 
and making tactical decisions based on that context. The previous 
Part identified the challenges that lawyers working for social change 
face and the extent to which those challenges require creativity. The 
next and concluding Part attempts to assess the extent to which these 
components of the three efforts to bring about social change 
highlighted above might offer ways for social-change lawyers to 
overcome these challenges through creativity. 
IV.   Creativity and the Social-Change Lawyer 
Part II set forth some of the challenges that lawyers must face 
when they try to bring about social change. We hope that these 
lawyers seek to make the lives of their clients—however they 
identify their clients—better through efforts to create lasting social 
change that is meaningful to those clients. Social-change work is 
challenging, however, precisely because it involves change: change 
to power relations, change to the status quo, and change in the 
policies that impact clients. Those challenges include that, first, they 
must alter the existing laws and policies—they cannot simply work 
within existing legal frameworks using tried-and-true, formulaic, and 
time-tested solutions to straightforward problems. 
Second, they must involve their clients and the communities they 
serve in the critical strategic decisions that the lawyers make as they 
chart a course for the advocacy out of fear that the legal strategy and 
the process by which it is developed may further marginalize the 
clients. There is always a risk that lawyer-centric strategies may 
weaken and distract from community efforts to achieve self-
determination and a more democratic society. Relying on elites like 
members of the legal profession to engage in social engineering that 
is not grounded in the lives and lived experiences of the clients that 
those lawyers ostensibly serve might actually perpetuate 
misunderstanding and marginalization. Moreover it would offer those 
communities victories that they have not sought and changes that are 
not necessarily beneficial to them, further solidifying their outsider 
status. Lawyers for social change must also strive to avoid a backlash 
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against their clients and the communities they represent, ensuring the 
ultimate goals of the representation are not undermined by short-term 
victories. Third, they must navigate between clients’ demands and 
donors’ preferences and desires, finding ways to fit their work within 
the constraints of existing funding sources or locate new financial 
support for work not supported by existing funding streams. Fourth, 
social-change lawyers must balance the need to meet ongoing and 
direct needs of individual clients against the long-term law-reform 
effortsthose that build the political power that is likely to bring 
about a reordering of social relations that are more just. Fifthand 
related to the fourth challengesocial-change lawyers must pursue 
complex goals and must do so on behalf of clients that are not always 
easily identified. Sixth, the social-change lawyer might have to 
choose among a wider array of tactics than the traditional lawyer 
simply because she may be foreclosed from using tactics commonly 
used in most lawyering work. This limitation on tactics means that 
the lawyer must look for other means of achieving client goals. 
The main point of this Article is that these challenges that the 
lawyer faces when trying to serve her clients in advancing social 
change create complexities for the lawyer that go beyond those that 
the traditional lawyer faces when serving her client. These 
complexities require creativity to address them and to serve the client 
with zeal to achieve the social change that will benefit that client. To 
what extent do the common features of the examples of successful 
social-change lawyering that I have provided here help chart a course 
for the social-change lawyer? Do the common characteristics of these 
examples of social-change lawyering offer techniques and tactics for 
bringing creativity to this work? 
Although iterative, incremental approaches help advocates hone 
better ideas, they also advance the cause of social change in a more 
just and democratic way by incorporating clients in the problem-
solving effort. Incremental approaches can help to satisfy them, at 
least partially, on the way toward bringing about the larger strategic 
measures that might ultimately lead to the broader social change that 
the lawyer seeks. Of course, some clients might express frustration 
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for the conservative nature of an incremental approach, but 
incrementalism might turn out to serve the long -term goals of the 
client and the client’s community better. Moreover, incremental, 
iterative approaches should include clients in the inspiration and 
experimentation phases by consulting with them as the lawyers and 
clients together determine the proper course of action. The lawyer 
should engage those clients in developing the experimental 
arguments that the lawyer may use, helping to “crowdsource” the 
ideas that the lawyer will promote—likely leading to better ideas—
but also investing the clients in the process itself, giving them 
confidence that the lawyer is taking the client’s problem seriously.298 
In addition, the lawyer can balance the need for broader change with 
addressing the client’s immediate needs through incremental 
measures that are designed to test ideas that can build toward more 
wide-ranging impacts in a way that helps alleviate the direct and 
immediate legal needs of the client. In this way, the lawyer can use 
incrementalism as a way to thread the needle between broader social 
change and the urgent needs of the client while she is waiting for that 
broader change to transpire. 
The “test case” model is a perfect example of this. A lawyer has a 
client with facts that serve to exemplify the broader problem other 
clients and communities face, but the lawyer files a narrow case on 
that client’s behalf in the hope of testing out her arguments on the 
courts, hopefully finding ones that will address the client’s immediate 
needs while also garnering feedback about what arguments may 
resonate with the courts should a larger, more wide-ranging action 
follow.299 
Incrementalism might also serve as an effective antidote to 
potential backlashthe reversal of victories or an erosion of 
                                                                                                                 
 298. On the value of crowdsourcing, see generally, JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 
(2005). As Tom Tyler’s research shows, engagement with a legal process helps people feel more 
connected to it and more trusting of the outcomes that come as a result. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: 
Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000). 
 299. Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1995) 
(describing and evaluating the test-case model of progressive lawyering). 
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rightswhich might come as opponents are energized by their own 
losses to harness their own collective energy and will take action to 
counteract the strides made by the forces of social change. Taking 
small steps allows the community to begin to see what social change 
might look like, experience it, realize that the change is itself not all 
that different from the status quo, and come to accept that change a 
small amount at a time. As more people begin to accept the 
changeeven if at a slow paceit gives opponents a smaller base of 
support when they begin to mount their challenges to the change. 
Another aspect of the creative social-change lawyering described 
in Part II is that each of the lawyers engaged in an exercise so critical 
to lawyering generally and social-change lawyering in particular: 
they used their interpretive powers to reframe issues, often seizing on 
the weaknesses of their opponents’ positions and exploiting them. 
For the social-change lawyer, her primary role in the context of 
efforts to bring about change is to serve as the translator of legal 
concepts in ways that can support the social change that she and her 
clients seek. What makes this aspect of social-change lawyering so 
creative is that the lawyer often must fit together received wisdom 
and the controlling legal narratives of dominant interpretations of the 
law that help to maintain and preserve the status quo.300 Dominant 
interpretations often leave little room for outsider perspectives on the 
law to convince decision makers of the interpretation that the social-
change lawyer seeks. This is precisely why social-change lawyers 
often must attempt a reassessment of the legal, sociological, ethical, 
moral, and factual bases and underpinnings of their opponents’ 
arguments. When faced with little room to maneuver and few options 
to make the affirmative case on their clients’ behalf, the creative 
lawyer can seek to encourage a reassessment of the support of the 
opponents’ position. And to carry out this reassessment, the lawyer 
                                                                                                                 
 300. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2411, 2438 (1989) (citation omitted). 
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deploys the tools of creativity described earlier, particularly 
reframing.301 
But does this type of reframing and reimagining help to overcome 
some of the challenges that the social-change lawyer must overcome 
in pursuing change? One of the main uses of this type of reframing is 
that it can often reaffirm the dignity of the community on whose 
behalf the lawyer is advocating. In the marriage-equality litigation, 
reframing the issues helped to promote the interests of the LGBTQ 
community by undermining the arguments of the marriage-equality 
opponents.302 In so doing, advocates destroyed the factual 
justifications for opposing marriage equality and helped fight the 
stigma that those justifications created. When marriage-equality 
opponents said that heterosexual marriage needed the endorsement of 
the state to ensure procreation, marriage-equality advocates argued 
that there were plenty of heterosexual couples who could not 
procreate—should the state not recognize their marriages then?303 
When opponents argued that children needed heterosexual couples to 
raise them, marriage-equality advocates presented overwhelming 
support for the proposition that children raised in same-sex 
households fared the same as those in households headed by 
heterosexual couples.304 Instead of further marginalizing and 
oppressing their client communities, the reframing of the issues 
helped reaffirm the dignity of their LGBTQ clients and their families. 
Through creative reframing, the lawyers were able to overcome 
                                                                                                                 
 301. Reframing should not be confused with “framing,” which in social science literature describes a 
process by which an individual or community may see the world to make sense of it. See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974). For one example of the role of political framing itself in 
progressive lawyering, see Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L. J. 804, 804 (2008). 
 302. Andrea Anastasi, Reframing the Fight for LGBT Equality as a First Amendment Issue, WHYY 
(May 5, 2015), https://whyy.org/articles/reframing-the-fight-for-lgbt-equality-as-a-first-amendment-
issue [https://perma.cc/MF9J-TCZF]. 
 303. FRANK, supra note 49, at 56–57. 
 304. What does the Scholarly Research say About the Well-Being of Children with Gay or Lesbian 
Parents?, WHAT WE KNOW (Dec. 2017) https://whatweknow.inequality.cornell.edu/topics/lgbt-
equality/what-does-the-scholarly-research-say-about-the-wellbeing-of-children-with-gay-or-lesbian-
parents [https://perma.cc/C9EE-TG8E]. 
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obstacles to the social change they sought while also avoiding some 
of the deeper pitfalls of social-change lawyering. 
Admittedly, this is not always the case. Indeed, the reframing 
carried out by Benjamin Butler when he called escaped slaves 
contraband did not sit well with abolitionists who thought Butler was 
accepting the South’s view of slaves as property too readily, and this 
reframing undermined the efforts to recognize the humanity and 
dignity of the slaves themselves—the very individuals Butler was 
trying to protect and save.305 There is thus sometimes a risk that 
accepting the opponents’ position in an effort to undermine it can 
have the effect of further marginalizing and demeaning the very 
clients that the lawyer seeks to serve. I do not know if anyone ever 
asked the escaped slaves who presented themselves on Fort Monroe 
in the early days of the war whether or not they approved of Butler’s 
tactics. My guess is they preferred freedom, but that is not to say that 
every interpretive act carried out by the social-change lawyer will 
always advance the client’s interests while also reaffirming the 
client’s basic dignity and humanity.306 Thus, although reframing can 
offer social-change lawyers an opportunity to advance their legal 
position, the process of identifying which arguments to make, how 
and when to make them, and to what ends are issues that should 
always be addressed in collaboration with the client and the 
community that the lawyer serves. That brings us back to the design-
thinking, or incremental, approach described above. To the extent 
that the interpretive strategies deployed by the lawyer are carried out 
in collaboration with the client, it is likely to yield better results that 
are reaffirming of the client and effective in the course of the 
representation. 
Similarly, by expanding the tools that the lawyer uses to carry out 
these interpretive functions, the lawyer can create more creative 
strategies by developing an appreciation for the ways in which the 
                                                                                                                 
 305. SupraLawyers and the Abolition of Slavery in the United States. 
 306. See White, supra note 53, at 28–29 (discussing ways in which a lawyer’s interpretation of a 
client’s story can undermine the dignity of the client). 
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dominant legal interpretation of particular social relations that the 
lawyer is challenging cannot hold up when assessed under the 
scrutiny of other disciplines. By leaving the realm of law altogether 
and seeking out support for one’s position from other disciplines, the 
social-change lawyer is able to overcome the opponents’ dominant 
positions and undermine them by looking at the problem in different 
ways from different perspectives.307 These different perspectives help 
to reveal the weaknesses, inconsistencies, and baselessness of the 
assumptions that often underpin dominant narratives and 
interpretations of the law and social relations. By incorporating 
insights from different disciplines in creative ways, the social-change 
lawyer identifies flaws in the dominant interpretation of the law and 
the extent to which those flaws often find a basis in unsupportable, 
stereotypical, and discriminatory animus. By bringing in perspectives 
from other disciplines, the lawyer can reveal the narrowness of the 
thinking that supports the opponents’ positions and use those 
perspectives to advance a richer understanding of the human 
experience and further the social-change goals that she seeks.308 
One way to further those goals in creative ways is to help the 
clients and the communities that the social-change lawyers serve 
build power. A critical way in which she helps those communities 
build power is through creative-coalition building. Central to 
creative-coalition building is the notion that coalitions often form 
around shared interests—together with shared ways of viewing the 
world—which is sometimes referred to in the social-science literature 
as “frame alignment.”309 The ability to identify those shared 
                                                                                                                 
 307. See Damon Centola, Robb Willer & Michael Macy, The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational 
Model of Self-Enforcing Norms, 4 AM. J. SOC. 1009, 1010 (2005) (describing power of different 
perspectives to help diminish the spread of false information). 
 308. In his study of the effective strategies of farmworker organizers in California in the latter half of 
the 20th century, Marshall Ganz showed that this type of openness to diverse views can help to improve 
organizational effectiveness because it creates networks of information and learning that lead to the 
collection of more salient information, which in turn leads to better, more informed, and more effective 
tactics and strategies. MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS: LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, 
AND STRATEGY IN THE CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER MOVEMENT 19–20 (2009). 
 309. David A. Snow, et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 (1986). 
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intereststo find opportunities where interests converge and 
alignrequires creativity, an ability to sense opportunities for 
collaboration, and crafting a campaign’s message in a way that it will 
attract supporters from as wide of a section of the populace as 
possible. This message crafting requires creativity and a sense of the 
needs and interests of different sectors of society. That necessitates a 
willingness to seek out, stay attuned to, and listen for opportunities 
where one’s clients’ interests will align with that of other individuals 
and groups who may serve as potential allies and supporters. In many 
ways, the pursuit of potential allies requires the tools of creativity as 
wellspecifically, an ability to reframe ideas and see things from 
different perspectives. In addition, the social-change lawyer can 
begin to identify potential allies and test out new theories that may 
bring those allies into the supportive fold by testing out theories 
through incremental steps. An example of this was the submission of 
an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States military’s service 
academies310 in support of the University of Michigan in defense of 
the use of racial diversity in admissions decisions in Grutter v. 
Bollinger311 and Gratz v. Bollinger.312 In these ways, some of the 
components of the social-change lawyering described here can work 
together to identify and tap into areas where interests converge. 
Finally, when the social-change lawyer takes into account the ways 
in which trends in the world beyond the law can affect arguments that 
one makes and the success she may have, she is recognizing that 
social change is always embedded in a context, and that context often 
determines the strategies that one can and should use to advance that 
social change. When doing so, the lawyer is also sensitive to the 
                                                                                                                 
 310. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003) (No. 02-516) (“Amici are former high-ranking officers and civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps, including former military-academy superintendents, Secretaries of 
Defense, and present and former members of the U.S. Senate . . . . Based on decades of experience, 
amici have concluded that a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to 
command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principal mission to provide national security.”). 
 311. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 312. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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ways in which her legal strategies can play out, how receptive 
potential allies will be to them, and the extent to which they might 
furtheror undermineefforts to build client power that can 
ultimately reorder social relations in a more just way. Taking into 
account the ways in which legal strategies might play out in the 
community and the broader society also helps the lawyer minimize 
the risk of backlash where a solution that might advance a client’s 
cause in one area or on one issue can actually undermine further 
advances or result in a retrenchment of rights generally, as opposition 
forces can use their own defeats as accelerants for actions that 
undermine the long-term interests of the communities that the social-
change lawyer serves.313 By incorporating an appreciation for 
political, socioeconomic, and cultural trends into the tactical decision 
making that the lawyer undertakes in collaboration with her client, 
the social-change lawyer can help to advance the interests of the 
client, ensure that the advocacy helps to increase and enhance the 
ability of that client to achieve self-determination and social justice, 
and minimize the risk of backlash against her efforts. Such an 
appreciation requires creativity and an openness to accept new 
information and incorporate it into one’s strategic decision-making 
processes that the social-change lawyer uses in collaboration with the 
clients that she serves. 
Thus, the social-change lawyer faces challenges beyond those that 
the traditional lawyer faces but has the tools at her disposal to address 
those challenges with skill and creativity. As the examples of the 
creative social-change lawyers highlighted here show, these lawyers 
exhibited common strategies for bringing about social change that 
revealed the creative ways in which these challenges. By seeking 
incremental change, reframing critical legal issues in new ways, 
incorporating interdisciplinary perspectives, seeking out 
                                                                                                                 
 313. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London a 
groundswell of community activism opposed to the decision led many state legislatures to take action to 
limit the eminent domain power of state and local governments. For a review of post-Kelo legislation, 
see Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance: An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 237, 237–38 (2009). 
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opportunities where interests converge, and exhibiting a sensitivity to 
emerging trends and the wider social and political context in which 
the lawyer’s efforts are taking place, the social-change lawyer can 
help overcome some of these challenges in creative and effective 
ways. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of lawyering for social change is long and storied. 
However, it is not without its challenges. At the heart of the lawyer’s 
work is problem solving. For the lawyer seeking to bring about social 
change, the problems that she faces are compounded by the existence 
of legal doctrine that is not generally consistent with the client’s 
position (hence the need for social change), the risk that advocacy 
can undermine the client’s long-term interest, and the fact that 
professionally driven and lawyer-centric advocacy can actually 
perpetuate the status quo and further oppress the clients that the 
lawyer seeks to serve. This Article has used three examples of 
lawyers who have advanced social change in an attempt to identify 
any common characteristics of their advocacy to understand the ways 
in which advocates have used creativity to achieve their social goals 
and overcome some of these barriers to problem solving in the social-
change context. Those common characteristics appear to be a 
willingness to pursue incremental change, the deft reframing of the 
legal issues that can advance or inhibit the lawyer’s work for change, 
the incorporation of interdisciplinary perspectives into the work, the 
search for opportunities for coalition building through the 
identification of where diverse interests converge among individuals 
and communities, and an appreciation for the ways in which political 
and other trends may impact the lawyer’s social-change efforts. Each 
of these components is a reflection of the ways in which these social-
change lawyers incorporated creativity into their work to overcome 
and offset some of the risks inherent in social-change lawyering. 
Although all lawyers solve problems, the social-change lawyer faces 
problems of a different quality and degree because she faces an 
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additional challenge: she is generally seeking to change the legal 
infrastructure that affects the lives of her clients rather than simply 
operating within it. The ability to use creative problem-solving 
techniques relevant to social-change lawyering is a critical 
competency of the social-change lawyer. This Article has been an 
attempt to identify some of those techniques and to recognize their 
role in social-change lawyering in the past. It is up to the lawyers of 
today and tomorrowthe lawyers working for social changeto 
determine the extent to which these techniques may prove useful in 
the future or whether or not new and different techniques are needed 
to bring about the social change that is clearly needed to create a 
more just, fair, and equal society. 
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